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THESIS

KOSOVO: THE BALKAN TIME BOMB?

by

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KOSOVO: THE BALKAN TIME BOMB?

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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June 1998

ABSTRACT

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The conflict between ethnic Albanians and Orthodox Christian Serbs in the Serbian region of Kosovo provides the foundation for a Fourth Balkan War. Kosovo was at the origin of the most recent Balkan conflict and may unravel peace efforts in the future. Serbia revoked Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989 and has instituted a campaign of repression that is currently unrivaled in Europe. The ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo comprises over ninety percent of the population and seeks recognition as the independent Republic of Kosovo.

Initially, ethnic Albanians responded peacefully to Serb antagonism, but impatience with the lack of progress has led to the use of terrorism to achieve political aims. The recent emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) as the vehicle for the armed opposition has provoked a series of violent Serb crackdowns. Ethnic Albanian leaders of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo understand the need for external support and are working to court the international community. Although outside intervention is a sine qua non of a solution to the Kosovo problem, the international community did not address the issue in the 1995 Dayton Accords.

This thesis examines the Albanian resistance movement and the emergence of an underground government since the early 1980's. It traces the historical origins of the conflict, explores the Serb obsession with the region, and attempts to evaluate the present situation through an number of potential scenarios. Based on current conditions, provincial ethnic violence could drive hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kosovo into neighboring Balkan states. The resulting shift in regional demography would most likely lead to the involvement of NATO and the United States. Serb intransigence, ethnic Albanian frustration, and the absence of international resolve to deal with Kosovo have resulted in a potentially dangerous situation that could erupt into regional war.

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ABBREVIATIONS

FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LKCK	National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
PLK	Liberal Party of Kosovo
PFK	Peasants Party of Kosovo
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PNDSH	Albanian National Democratic Party
PPK	Parliamentary Party
PSDK	Social Democratic Party of Kosovo
PSHDK	Albanian Christian Democratic Party
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SPS	Serbian Socialist Party
UCK	Liberation Army of Kosovo
UNIKOMB	National Unity Party
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment
USIA	United States Information Agency
YA	Yugoslav Army
YNA	Yugoslav National Army
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Serbia's revocation of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 rocked Yugoslavia and started a chain of events that eventually lead to war in Bosnia and Croatia. Ethnic Albanians represent the majority of the population in the southern Serb province of Kosovo, but are currently restrained under the daunting force of Serb repression. This territory is the heart of traditional Serbia and the Serbs' powerful religious attachment to the area has prevented a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Traditionally, Kosovo has been the most densely populated region of the former Yugoslavia; its two million inhabitants live in an area measuring roughly forty-four hundred square miles.¹ Today, Kosovo is a flashpoint in the Balkans which threatens to unravel the fragile peace established by the international community in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is so because the international effort that produced the 1995 Dayton Accords failed to take Kosovo into account.

This thesis will examine the Albanian resistance movement in the Serb province of Kosovo since the 1981 riots, including the historical origins of the conflict, the Serb obsession with this region, the ethnic Albanian position, and implications for the international community. The analysis will include a discussion of all elements of ethnic Albanian opposition and its various stages of development. There are several questions that must be addressed relating to the Albanian underground government. How can a

¹Peter Prifti, "Kosova's Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Arshi Pipa and Sam Repishti (eds.), *Studies on Kosova*, East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, New York, 1984, p. 125.

parallel ethnic Albanian state exist within Serbia? What is the structure and organization of the “shadow” Kosovar government? Who are its leaders? What are their objectives and demands? What is the potential of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK)?

Serbia’s implementation of a number of both violent and non-violent police tactics in an effort to dominate Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority is like nothing else in Europe today. In addition to the massive police and military presence in Kosovo, Belgrade has sponsored a program of repression that includes the violation of human rights, employment discrimination, exclusionary measures in the field of education, and control over the media. Exclusion in the area of education has paralyzed economic development in Kosovo and has meant that the fastest growing population in Europe is not being properly educated. Serb repression coupled with the post-Cold War economic hardship and international sanctions, is creating an ominous situation in the region.

Ethnic Albanian inhabitants currently comprise over ninety percent of the population and have responded to Serb repression by establishing a parallel system of government, with independence as their ultimate goal. Recently, the Albanian opposition has grown impatient with the lack of progress in the province and this has led to an abandonment of peaceful resistance in favor of violence through terrorism. The emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) illustrates the dangerous shift from peaceful resistance to the potential for armed insurrection.

The final chapter of this study discusses several potential scenarios for conflict and for conflict resolution in Kosovo. These scenarios include, but are not limited to, a unified Albania, an independent Kosovo, a greater federalization of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia, a restoration of autonomy, the partitioning of the province, ethnic war, and a continuation of the current stagnant situation.

The concept of a greater Albania in the Balkans remains unrealistic. Albania would have to spearhead the effort and does not have the political, economic, or military means to achieve unification. Furthermore, the absence of a strong movement on behalf of the largest concentrations of Albanians in the region makes any attempt to unify particularly problematic.

The goal of the Kosovar opposition led by Ibrahim Rugova continues to be an independent Kosovo. To date, only Albania has recognized the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo and it appears that independence is only possible with the support of the international community. At the time of this writing, the international community has stressed that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia and must seek solutions through Belgrade. It is almost certain that any attempt by Kosovo to secede from Serbia would result in a massive Serb military deployment.

One option that has been offered as a solution in Kosovo is that of an intensified federalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This scenario would make Kosovo an equal republic with Serbia, the Sandžak region, Montenegro, and Vojvodina. Chances for the adoption of this course of action are slim, however, as this idea runs counter to the strong Serb nationalism that has fought to maintain control over the former Yugoslavia.

The reestablishment of autonomy has been suggested for Kosovo and it is this option that the international community is most inclined to support in the future. Both Serbs and ethnic Albanians are opposed to autonomy for Kosovo, however. Particularly

problematic for the restoration of autonomy is the tremendous change that has occurred in the region in recent years. An autonomous Kosovo today would be very different from what it would have been in the days of Tito's Yugoslavia. The absence of the old Yugoslav republics would place Kosovo under the sole control of Serbia. Alternatively, the partitioning of the province along ethnic boundaries is a possible, but unlikely, solution. Serbia relies on Kosovo for its vast supply of natural resources and any attempt to divide Kosovo would surely result in a prolonged struggle for control over territory of vital economic and religious value.

Ethnic war has plagued the Balkans for centuries, destroying lives and hindering progress. The power of nationalism and the destructive potential of ethnic conflict was recently witnessed in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is nothing to prevent the expansion of regional violence that could include Turkey, Albania, Greece, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Kosovars have sought refuge in these countries and it is quite possible that ethnic violence could lead to a massive migration of Albanians out of Kosovo. Many of these countries are ill-equipped to deal with an influx of refugees and remain concerned about their own minority populations.

A Fourth Balkan War would present serious problems for NATO. An expanded conflict in the Balkans would place severe stresses and strains on the alliance as it works to solve security challenges in Bosnia. Moreover, United States troops continue to maintain a presence along the Macedonian border and would likely become engaged in spillover violence from an ethnic war triggered in Kosovo.

Finally, a continuation of the status quo in Kosovo could lead to further deterioration in Serb-Albanian relations over the province. Pressure is building as Serb repression continues unabated in Kosovo. Kosovo's separate institutions of government, education, healthcare, and media outlets have fostered an unhealthy division between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Furthermore, the absence of international political and financial support has restricted progress in Serbia and has created an economic imbalance in the Balkans. These problems, coupled with the lack of a productive international dialogue on the situation, do not bode well for peace in the future.

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I. INTRODUCTION

We support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and aim to see Bosnia's Balkan neighbors embarked on the path of democracy and market reform - including Serbia's restoration of autonomy to Kosovo² and the return of civil society and democracy.³

A. THE MAKINGS OF A FOURTH BALKAN WAR?

The situation in the Serb province of Kosovo was the catalyst for the bloody conflict that has plagued the Balkans in recent years. It is this increasingly tense situation between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim Albanians living in this region that provides the foundation for a potential Fourth Balkan War. This unstable situation in Kosovo has been left largely unaddressed by the international community.

The 1.8 million ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo deeply resent domination by a minority Serb leadership. A number of extremely violent Albanian demonstrations in the early 1980's, met by a brutal Serb response, was an early indicator of the potential for violence in this province. Serb President Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989 and used the Serb minority in this region to shore up his political position. The Serb leadership has vowed never to relinquish control over this area of the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanian inhabitants have essentially had their

²In order to avoid confusion with regard to spelling, the following rules have been established: "Kosovo," ending in "o" is the Serbo-Croatian spelling and will be utilized throughout this study. In Albanian, Kosovo is spelled "Kosova" and ethnic Albanians are referred to as Kosovars. For the purposes of this examination, Albanians in Kosovo will be referred to as ethnic Albanians or Kosovars.

³William J. Clinton, President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, May 1997.

constitutional rights eliminated and, though a majority, have virtually no say in their government. In many respects, this is the most repressive situation in Europe. Kosovo survives today in the shadow of Bosnia's ethnic cleansing.

Recently, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), also referred to as the Liberation Army of Kosovo, has taken responsibility for numerous acts of terrorism. This organization is fighting to create an independent ethnic state for the numerous Muslim-Albanians living in Kosovo. Serb authorities have implemented harsh measures in an effort to contain the violence related to this movement, which is capturing international attention. Human rights observers have generally been restricted from monitoring the situation in Kosovo. Serb authorities have also stationed significant elements of the Yugoslav Army throughout Kosovo in an effort to stem the expanding guerilla movement. By current standards the situation in Kosovo is intractable and may lead to war.

The ethnic Albanian population continues to grow and is expected to double in size to almost four million in the next twenty years. This growth rate is currently the highest in all of Europe. The interests of this expanding majority must be recognized and dealt with, as this is clearly a problem that cannot be ignored by the West.

B. RELEVANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The absence of any conception of a postwar settlement or regional solution to the Balkan conflict was especially apparent in the case of Kosovo and by implication Macedonia.⁴

⁴Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 398.

The relations in Kosovo between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim Albanians are tense and are liable to erupt into war. The absence of a productive dialogue, together with the recent shift in tactics of the Kosovar opposition, could prove disastrous. A war in Kosovo would most likely drive hundreds of thousands of refugees out of the province. These refugees would flee into neighboring Balkan states that are currently not able to accommodate them. The resulting shift in demographics would most likely lead to the involvement of Turkey, Greece, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. A conflict involving Greece and Turkey has the potential to strain the U.S. commitment to peace in the region. The United States would be forced to mediate between two NATO allies at war.

In 1992, President George Bush related his concerns and the potential for U.S. involvement:

In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.⁵

Indeed, United States military involvement in a Fourth Balkan War is highly likely. As it is, U.S. forces continue to patrol the Macedonian border and are heavily involved in SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It appears that the peaceful resistance campaign instituted by the shadow government led by Ibrahim Rugova has broken down, resulting in a new wave of violence. The situation was exacerbated by the signing of the December 1995 Dayton

⁵John M. Goshko, "Bush Threatens Military Force If Serbs Attack Ethnic Albanians," *The Washington Post*, December 29, 1992, p. A10, quoted by Alexandros K. Kyrou, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 1996, p. 257.

agreement. Dayton essentially “papered” over the Kosovo issue, which has led the Albanian opposition to intensify its efforts. Furthermore, the United States has refused to recognize Kosovo’s ultimate goal of independence and has insisted that it must seek a solution to its problems *within* Serbia.

Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo may resort to more violence in an effort to bring fresh attention to their plight. A distinct cultural separation that has traditionally existed between ethnic Albanians and Orthodox Christian Serbs has been widened by an increase in ethnic crimes. The ethnic Albanian parallel system of government and Serb intransigence have created a barrier to communication critical for stability. Particularly important to United States policy is support for an increase in international involvement which may serve to close the expanding communication gap. An effective dialogue between the parties could ease tensions and stabilize the situation.

Although not well organized at this time, the terrorist organizations operating within Kosovo appear to be gathering the attention of the international community. The Serb response, as stated earlier, has been to use force in an effort to suppress this surge in terrorist activity. Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic rose to power on the Kosovo issue and does not appear to have the ability to allow even minimal concessions at this time. Milosevic, the “master of Balkan politics” for the past ten years, has been able to cling to power against tremendous internal and external pressure on his regime. He has gathered sufficient political support to allow him to convert the presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into a position of unprecedented power. To

date, the Serb leader has not granted ethnic Albanians concessions which would serve to contradict the policy that catapulted him into power. Furthermore, the cultural importance Serbs attach to the region remains a rigid barrier to future concessions.

Finally, ethnic Albanians are frustrated with the lack of progress, and the recent increase in violence may be an indicator that the situation in Kosovo has reached the point of perilous escalation. As Carl Bildt stated earlier this year;

Serbia can't be stable, prosperous, and harmonious if it does not reconcile the issue of Kosovo. Serbia can't live as a European country with the continuous state of repression in Kosovo. It is simply not possible.⁶

The following are findings of House Resolution 4115 - Kosovo Peace and Democracy Act of 1994.⁷

- Human rights violations in Kosovo are widespread and have worsened since the dismissal of human rights observers in July of 1993.
- The majority of the people in Kosovo voted for independence and a new government, which has not been permitted to meet.
- Presidents Bush and Clinton have explicitly warned Serbia that the U.S. would not tolerate Serbia's expansion of the conflict in Kosovo.
- Congress has provided for the establishment of a USIA Cultural Office in Kosovo pursuant to Public Law 102-138.

⁶"European Union's Carl Bildt Warns of Kosovo Violence," *Berserkistan in Bosnia*, July 5, 1997. Online. Available http://www.linder.com/berserk/kosovo_bildt.html

⁷"Situation in Kosovo," Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Europe and The Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1994.

The White House has made it clear in the May 1997 *National Security Strategy* that it is dedicated to the restoration of autonomy in Kosovo.

The Albanian problem is greater than the Bosnian problem and potentially more dangerous. The disintegration of Yugoslavia began with the abrogation by Serbia of Kosovo's autonomy.⁸

We now turn to an historical overview of the conflict, which will provide the necessary foundation for a comprehensive discussion of the Albanian resistance.

⁸ Sir Reginald Hibbert, "More Dangerous than Bosnia?" *The World Today*, Vol. 52, No. 8/9, August - September 1996, p. 230.

II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO

The current disorder in Kosovo has become a permanent part of the unrest that has inundated the Balkans since the 12th Century. The conflict has matured with two very different historical accounts regarding control over the region. There are a number of Serb historians that claim that the Albanians are new residents of this traditionally Serb region (see figure 1). However, in his book *Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg*, Elez Biberaj writes that for centuries the region was inhabited by both Serbs and Albanians, with the Albanians, the direct descendants of the original settlers of the Balkans—the Illyrians—being in the majority.⁹

Dr. D.E.M. Mihas, an independent political scientist, poet, and linguist offers the following about ethnic Albanians in Southeastern Europe:

In some cases, Albanian communities of the Balkans seem to be more homogenous than Albania itself which is divided along major tribal, religious, and linguistic lines which still play a significant role among Albanians, as they do among other (European) countries first.¹⁰

It is important to note that not all Albanians adhere to Islam, as almost one third of the Albanians in Albania are actually Christian. “Statistics on religion seem to have paid little attention to the fact that, because of Ottoman domination, a number of Albanians

⁹ Elez Biberaj, “Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg,” *Conflict Studies* 258, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, United Kingdom, February 1993, p. 3.

¹⁰D.E.M. Mihas, “Another Balkan Dilemma: Albania and Kosovo,” *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 269, No. 1566, London, England, 1996, p. 13.



Figure 1. Orientation Map of Kosovo (From Ref. Elez Biberaj, *Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg*)

obtained Islamic names without necessarily losing their Christian faith.”¹¹ However, the Albanian population in Kosovo is almost entirely Muslim. Consequently, religion is a much larger factor for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo than in Albania proper.

The Kosovars are associated with one of two groups that comprise the Albanian population in Albania. These two groups are known as the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs populate northern Albania and it is from this area that Kosovars first settled in Kosovo.¹² The Tosks inhabit southern Albania and together these groups have struggled for control of this Southeastern European state.

A. KOSOVO: A SERB HOLY LAND

The account of Prince Lazar and his defeat by the Ottoman Turks on the Field of Blackbirds during the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 dominates Serb history. The significance of the Battle of Kosovo to Serbia and the territory upon which it was fought has become sacred for the Serbs. It was on the evening before the battle that Lazar related:

Whoever is a Serb and of Serbian birth, and who does not come to Kosovo Polje to do battle against the Turks, let him have neither a male nor a female offspring, Let him have no crop,...¹³

The Serbs believe that it was this Turkish victory that started more than five centuries of rule and forced them from Kosovo. Additionally, it is believed that during Ottoman rule the Orthodox Christian Serbs lost the best land and a once prosperous Kosovo

¹¹Mihas, p. 13.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y., 1993, p. 39.

entered a period of economic stagnation.

Kosovo became a symbol of steadfast courage and sacrifice for honor, much as the Alamo for Americans - only Kosovo was the Alamo writ large, where Serbs lost their whole nation, but in the words of Sam Houston, it would be remembered and avenged.¹⁴

Kosovo has often been referred to as the “Serb Jerusalem.” The sacred nature of this area for Serbs has been a colossal barrier to a peaceful solution to the issue. This region was the heart of Serbia where large numbers of monasteries and churches were constructed. The strong religious attachment to the region made Turkish occupation all the more painful. Serbs migrated northward in search of a better life, as Orthodox Christian Serbs were considered inferior to their conquerors and were forbidden to own land in Kosovo.¹⁵ Serb history of Kosovo presents the Albanians as occupiers who crossed the Albanian mountains to settle in Serbia. Regardless of the two different historical accounts, it is quite clear that during this period the Albanian population expanded while the Serb population dwindled in Kosovo.

Blind glorification of their medieval past has prevented the Serbs from a national self-reckoning based on a more accurate reading of the situation in Kosovo.¹⁶

This commentary has been presented because it stands at the center of the conflict in Kosovo. Serbs appear to view any restoration of autonomy to Kosovo as a loss of

¹⁴ Alex N. Dragnich and Slavko P. Todorovich, *The Saga of Kosovo*, Columbia University Press, New York, N.Y., 1984, p. 27.

¹⁵“Situation in Kosovo,” Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Background paper, *Kosovo: The Next Post-Yugoslav Crisis?* p. 105.

¹⁶Biberaj, p. 3.

Serbia's territorial integrity. Vukasin Jokanovic, Serbia's Federal Minister for Internal Affairs, stated the following: "Yugoslavia cannot give in where her integrity is concerned."¹⁷

B. THE END OF TURKISH RULE

The Albanian population fought for independence in Kosovo through an organization known as the League of Prizren and achieved some degree of freedom from the Turks in the summer of 1912.¹⁸ However, this situation would soon change with the onset of the First Balkan War. The Serbs finally won control of Kosovo after soundly defeating the Turks during the First Balkan War of 1912. Serb control over the region was coupled with intense efforts to dominate almost every aspect of Kosovo's culture. The following originates from a Carnegie Endowment report about Serb actions in Kosovo as early as 1912:

Houses and whole villages were reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred in mass, incredible acts of violence, pillage, and brutality of every kind—such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians.¹⁹

The Albanian population was divided between the new state of Albania and the Serb province of Kosovo. Additionally, Serb leadership attempted to alter the

¹⁷"Kosovo - only in Serbia," *Serbia Bulletin*, May 1996. Online. Available <http://www.yugoslavia.com/Bulletin/96/9605/960513.htm>

¹⁸"Situation in Kosovo," p. 105.

¹⁹Iseljavanje Arnanta, GRMCK, Gvidara and Simac (eds.), *L'nettoyage ethnique*, pp. 161-185, Cf. Phillip Cohen, *Desecrating the Holocaust*, p. 30. quoted by Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War*, William Heinemann Ltd, Great Britain, 1994, p. 193.

demographics in Kosovo so as to make the region more accommodating for the Serb population.

Despite fierce ethnic opposition, over 40,000 Orthodox Slav peasants moved into Kosovo and half a million ethnic Albanians were forced to emigrate, mainly to Albania, Macedonia, and Turkey.²⁰

Clearly, both the Serb and ethnic Albanian populations endured tremendous hardship during these changes in regional control. The loss of land, homes, and livelihoods contributed to an increasing trend toward economic backwardness. This instability further frustrated relations between the two inhabitants which resulted in ethnic hatred and genocide. Peace and security in Kosovo were remote for both populations during this tumultuous period regardless of the regime in power. It was not until World War I that ethnic Albanians began to feel some relief with regard to Serb dominance.

Between 1916 and 1918, Kosovo was occupied by Austro-Hungarian forces and nearly 300 Albanian schools were re-opened after a period of Serb closure.²¹

Albania proper annexed Kosovo during World War II. The Italian dictator, Mussolini, invaded the Balkans in 1939 and this action was coupled with a movement to create a greater Albania. It was after the Italian surrender in September of 1943 that the Germans inherited Albania and supported Albanian nationalism to include the movement for a greater Albania.

²⁰Barbara Frey, "The Minnesota Plan: Recommendations for Preventing Gross Human Rights Violations in Kosovo," *Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights*, Occasional Paper # 8, February, 1993, p. 2.

²¹ Derek Hall, *Albania and the Albanians*, Pinter Reference, New York, N.Y., 1994, p. 201.

The defeat of Germany and the end of World War II effectively ended the campaign for a greater Albania. The Albanian population has never truly acted with a strong sense of uniformity. The Albanian population spread from Albania throughout Southeastern Europe. Interestingly, there does not appear to be a strong attachment to Albania proper on behalf of the Kosovars and other Albanians living outside Albania. The Kosovars and their Albanian brothers were never able to build an effective coalition to achieve a greater Albania. This is due in large part to the vast Albanian tribal, linguistic, and religious differences alluded to earlier. In truth, Kosovars have enjoyed a better living standard and more freedom than Albanians in other areas of the Balkans. Nevertheless, the Albanian resistance to Serb dominance has been unswerving in Kosovo.

Marshal Josip Broz Tito and his form of Communism successfully unified the various republics (now independent states) that encompassed the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo was established as an autonomous region within the former Yugoslavia by 1947 and eventually became known as the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo in 1969. Tito devolved power to the various individual Yugoslav republics which was far from the standard in the former Soviet Union. Titoist federalism with its loose decentralized style would provide substantial breathing room for the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. It was this space permitted by Tito that served as a foundation for the modern ethnic Albanian opposition movement.

The unusual Yugoslav relaxation during this period strengthened Albanian nationalist feelings regarding Kosovo. Titoist policies appeared to favor ethnic

Albanians and this resulted in a significant alteration of regional demography. Almost 200,000 Serbs were allegedly forced to leave or left Kosovo during the twenty year period, 1961-1981.²² It is important to note that although unprecedented rights were granted, this freedom was Yugoslav freedom and not part of an effort for a greater Albania. The 1950 Tito-Stalin split ended any effort to incorporate Albania into the former Yugoslavia.

Massive amounts of economic assistance flowed from Yugoslav Federal development funds and from the World Bank. The Serbs accused Albanian leadership in Kosovo of using this money for unlawful purposes. The accusations included the alleged Albanian purchase of large tracts of Serb held land. However, it is hard to gather evidence to support any large scale “buy out” of the Serbs. This mid 1950’s to late 1960’s Yugoslav government in Belgrade was deluged with a tremendous increase of Serb complaints. A shift in power towards the Albanian majority was accompanied by a rise in Serb nationalism. Albanian complaints of police abuse were also high during the Tito years as the Yugoslav government tried to control the province. Yugoslav efforts to develop this southern region of Serbia resulted in an extremely high growth rate. The ethnic Albanian population continues to grow and is expected to double in size over the next twenty years. This tremendous growth rate is currently the highest in all of Europe. These figures do not bode well for Serbs who seek to maintain their stronghold on the region.

²² Dragnich and Todorovich, p. 158.

The Tito years yielded an aggressive campaign to reverse the educational deficiencies of Kosovars. This resulted in the construction of numerous Albanian schools and a dedication to higher university level education in the capital of Pristina. Although in better economic shape than many areas of the Balkans, Kosovo was perceived as “backward” with little or no productivity. The economic assistance alluded to earlier was designed to modernize all aspects of Kosovo. Unfortunately, Alexander Rankovic, minister of internal affairs and vice president of Yugoslavia was adamant about strict control over the Albanians. It was during Rankovic’s tenure that the modern Serb strategy of police repression was developed and these activities had a very detrimental effect on provincial development.

Tito removed Rankovic from power in 1966 and softened his administration’s approach to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Unfortunately for Serbia, Tito may have done more harm than good, as the following effectively illustrates the rise of Albanian nationalism:

By removing police pressure and granting more concessions to the Kosovars to ensure their loyalty to Yugoslavia, the government had unwittingly assisted the Albanians in becoming more conscious of their rights and strengths.²³

Ethnic Albanian national awareness and a new sense of liberty led to violent demonstrations in 1968. The demand for an independent ethnic Albanian Kosovo was the cause of the violence. As alluded to earlier, a Kosovar goal of a greater Albania was not as strong as the desire for an independent republic. In light of the emergence

²³ Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians*, I. B. Tauris, New York, N.Y., 1995, p. 192.

of Albanian nationalism during this period, it is important to acknowledge that Kosovars were increasingly wary of Communism.²⁴

An economic crisis in the early 1970's exacerbated the tense environment in Kosovo. It has been suggested that the cultural barrier erected by both Albanians and Serbs was an impediment to economic growth. Albanians insisted on their own language, schools, and a strict adherence to social customs. This was in direct opposition to and conflicted with, the Serb population's daily routine common to all of Serbia. The collision of these two different cultures was not conducive to productivity.

C. PRISTINA AND MODERN RESISTANCE

Albanian students staged a series of violent protests in Pristina during the early 1980's. The demonstrations centered on a renewed sense of Albanian nationalism. Ethnic Albanian students and numerous Serb policemen were killed during the violence. Additionally, destruction of Serb monuments and damage to religious facilities in Kosovo further aggravated the strained relations. The Pristina protests and subsequent crackdown during the Spring of 1981 were indicative of the hostile atmosphere that disrupted life in Kosovo for centuries and served as a prelude to future Serb repression.

Nothing needed changing in the system, and the cause lay not in the socio-economic development of Kosovo, but in *nationalism*, which had

²⁴Viktor Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1983, p. 47.

been exploited from abroad.²⁵

The protests, instituted primarily by students, confused older Yugoslav Communist leaders. The leadership implemented a campaign to rid Kosovo of ethnic Albanian nationalism. Educational cooperation with institutions external to Kosovo was terminated and a purge of provincial leaders was instituted.²⁶ A negative media blitz was directed toward Albania, as Yugoslav Central Committee leaders interpreted the source of Kosovo's problems as Tirana, Albania.²⁷ These actions represented a grave misunderstanding of Kosovo's problems and a failure to acknowledge that 78 percent of the population was making their interests known.

The April 2, 1981, joint communique of the Federal Presidency and of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia confidently asserted that Albanian nationalism has nothing in common with the demands of most in Kosovo.²⁸

The inability to comprehend inequality and Albanian nationalism set an unhealthy precedent for the handling of current crisis. In the end, the number of dead and wounded during the heightened violence of the 1980's varies with the source, but it was this violence that set the stage for the modern conflict.

²⁵Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, "The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views," *Conflict Studies*, No. 137-138, 1982, p. 9.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸Sta Se Dogadjalo na Kosovu, p. 21, quoted by Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1993, p. 61.

The publication of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences 1986

Memorandum had a profound effect on the Kosovars. This document essentially stated that Serbia had been unfairly discriminated against for years and that the Yugoslav League of Communists was largely to blame. Slobodan Milosevic's effort to gain power in Serbia led to a certain type of *de-Titoization* campaign. The Yugoslav League of Communists and those in power were to blame for problems that afflicted all of the former Yugoslavia. *The Memorandum* stated quite clearly that autonomy granted to Kosovo was wrong and criticized the Albanian leadership governing the province. Charges against the Albanian population continued and seemed to reach an apex when Slobodan Milosevic arrived in Kosovo in an attempt to appease the restless Serb population. Milosevic was clearly exploiting the Serb minority status for maximum political gain. In an April speech in 1987, the Serb leader addressed crowds of Serbs in Kosovo and stated:

You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your land just because it's difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. It was never part of the Serbian and Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when it's time to fight. You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed.²⁹

It was by November 1988 that Milosevic began to lay the foundations of a plan that would eliminate Kosovo's autonomous status. The Kosovo party leadership was dismissed and ethnic Albanians feared the worst as Serb police were deployed to

²⁹Laura Silber and Alan Little, *Yugoslavia Death of A Nation*, Penguin Books USA, 1996, p. 38.

control Kosovo. Milosevic installed his own leadership and this was met with shocking turmoil. There was a number of violent clashes and protests as a new *Serb* constitution released in March of 1989 eliminated Kosovo's autonomous status. Moreover, a *federal* constitution was rammed through a disintegrating Yugoslav government in April of 1992. It was evident that Slobodan Milosevic was tailoring his Serb governing apparatus to suit Serb interests. Incredibly, Milosevic pointed to the democratic ideals contained within these documents as the international community squeezed Serbia with sanctions.

Kosovo's government at the local level, state enterprises, newspapers, television, and academic positions were all placed under control of Serb authorities. A large segment of the Albanian population joined the unemployed and were no longer able to sustain their already low standard of living, as their annual per capita income was less than \$400.00.³⁰ The University of Pristina was renamed after Dositej Obradovic, a Serbian scholar.³¹ Over 800 Albanian professors were fired at the university.³² Furthermore, Serbo-Croatian supplanted Albanian as the official language of Kosovo. Latin street names were replaced by Cyrillic Serbian names.³³ Numerous monuments to Albanian culture were destroyed or ripped down during this period.

³⁰Charles J. Brown, "Keeping it Safe for Serbia," *Freedom Review*, Vol. 23, No. 5, September-October, 1992, p. 24

³¹Hall, p. 209.

³²Brown, p. 24.

³³Hall, p. 209.

Clearly, the new Serb leadership was trying to compensate for perceived Albanian hostility toward the Serb culture in Kosovo.

Slobodan Milosevic utilized the 600th anniversary of Prince Lazar's death to address the Serb people in a speech that effected all of Yugoslavia. It was in this speech that Milosevic essentially mobilized the Serb population for a greater Serbia. Unfortunately, for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Milosevic's use of the Serb minority status to cement his political position would leave the Albanian majority with little hope for reestablishing their independence.

Albanians responded aggressively to Milosevic's constitutional sideshow with a vote to separate from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Serb leaders in Belgrade declared all underground referendums illegal and launched a firm crackdown on all demonstrations.

III. SERB STRATEGY AND THE KOSOVARS

On the subject of Kosovo, the Serbian province where the Clinton Administration has repeatedly asked Mr. Milosevic to halt abuses against the majority Albanian population, Mr. Milosevic replied, according to the cable: "It is only of interest to a few American Congressmen. We will solve it our own way."³⁴

The Serbs have traditionally instituted an array of both violent and non-violent police tactics to force ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Presently, control over the region is achieved by a massive Serb military and police presence. The current disposition of Serb forces in Kosovo includes more than 40,000 active duty military troops and at least 30,000 police officers.³⁵ Ethnic Albanians are keenly aware of Serb military potential and recognize that they do not possess the means with which to wage an armed insurrection.

After Milosevic had established himself as the leader of the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) in 1990, he began to support legislation that would ensure Serb control over Kosovo. The Serb parliament established a law known as "Special Circumstance" on labor relations in Kosovo, which allowed for Serbs to take jobs from Kosovars.³⁶ The goal of the Milosevic Administration was to ethnically cleanse the region of Kosovars and reverse the Serb minority status. This plan would be implemented

³⁴Jane Perlez, "Cable Reveals a Combative Serb Leader," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1997.

³⁵"Strategic Assessment," *Institute for National Strategic Studies*, 1997, p. 152.

³⁶Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, "The Minnesota Plan: Recommendations for Preventing Gross Human Rights Violations in Kosovo," February, 1993, p. I-4.

through the aforementioned employment discrimination, police violence, reform in education, and control of the media.

A. POLICE VIOLENCE AND THE YUGOSLAV ARMY (YA)³⁷

The following description of Serb anti-Albanian tactics was uncovered in a paper written in 1937 by Dr. Vasa Cubrilovic, a member of the group that plotted the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914.

In order to create an atmosphere of fear and a willingness to leave, the Serbian state ought to use very un-Balkan tactics: The law must be enforced to the letter...fines and imprisonments, the ruthless application of all police dispositions, such as the prohibition of smuggling, cutting forests, damaging farmland, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labor and any other measures that an experienced police force can contrive.³⁸

Dr. Cubrilovic pioneered early Serb police tactics that were used widely against Albanians. The relatively non-violent tactics referred to above were coupled with Vasa's *other*, more violent tactics, and it was this deadly combination that made Serb police action so efficient.

There is one more method which Serbia used very effectively after 1878, the secret burning of Albanian villages and town quarters.³⁹

³⁷The Yugoslav Army (YA) used to be referred to as the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) or the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) prior to its reorganization in 1992. The elements of the YA currently stationed in Kosovo receive their command and control from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Third Army located in Nis, Serbia.

³⁸ Almond, p. 195.

³⁹Vasa Cubrilovic, "Deportation of Albanians," in Boze Covic (ed.), *Roots of Serbian Aggression*, Center for Foreign Languages, Zagreb, Croatia, 1993, p. 123.

Alexander Rankovic, the former Yugoslav Minister of Interior, developed a menacing security police force to carry out an anti-Albanian mission during the late 1950's and early 1960's. This use of a Serb dominated police force did not attract significant foreign attention that often occurs when using military power in domestic affairs. Rankovic's style was not unlike that suggested by Cubrilovic almost thirty years earlier. The Rankovic repression was not scrutinized or evaluated because of the stature of his political position.⁴⁰ This *Stalinist* approach to internal control did not entirely end with the removal of Rankovic in 1966. Although Tito removed Rankovic and allowed Kosovo unprecedented autonomy by the late 1960's, the harsh Rankovic measures were restored twenty years later by Slobodan Milosevic.

Serbia has never faced significant armed Albanian resistance until the recent emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK). However, the UCK does not possess sophisticated weapons that Serbia maintains in its police and military arsenal. The Albanians in Kosovo were never able to acquire the military power common to Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia that migrated into non-Serb hands prior to the recent hostilities.

In 1989 during the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy, Milosevic acted quickly in replacing Albanians with Serbs in positions of power. There was a multitude of Albanian intellectuals and military officers arrested at this time. The motivation for such arrests was the fear that Albanian leadership would plot to overthrow the newly installed Serb provincial government. It has been estimated that 4,000 ethnic Albanian

⁴⁰ Vickers, p. 191.

police officers were dismissed from their posts since 1990.⁴¹ The quick transition of provincial control that was supported by the Yugoslav Army (YNA), allowed for the successful retention of maximum military assets. The support provided by the Yugoslav Army was not welcome by an agitated Albanian population and this intervention served as an example for the rest of the former Yugoslavia.

Kosovo taught the YNA and the Serbian political class a fateful and misleading lesson. Because the deployment of a massive paramilitary force and the evident willingness to use it had cowed open rebellion by the Albanians in the province after 1981, The YNA's generals and Milosevic's political allies concluded that the threat of force and the occasional salutary use of it in localized form would suffice to intimidate any separatists in other republics.⁴²

Serb leadership discovered that a transition to a more domestic police-like organization for security was essential. Nevertheless, Serb officials have stationed soldiers and heavily armed police in Kosovo.⁴³

Inevitably YNA methods of defending the revolution in Kosovo were seen very negatively by Kosovar Albanians. For these ordinary citizens, the army was an occupying force, denying them human rights, and silencing legitimate grievances.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Situation in Kosovo, p. 99.

⁴² Almond, p. 207.

⁴³ Novi Vjesnik, (Zagreb), Trans in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe, Washington, D.C., - FBIS EEU, 92-238, December, 10, 1992, p. 47.

⁴⁴ Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*, Westview Press, 1996, The Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition, Robin Alison Remington, p. 160.

The Yugoslav Army (YA) has been riddled with de-politicization and financial problems, but their vast inventory of military hardware must be recognized for its potential. In the years prior to 1991, the former Yugoslav National Army (YNA) was to employ the “burnt land model” in Kosovo in an effort to control ethnic Albanian disturbances.⁴⁵ Their goal was to disorganize a mass ethnic Albanian revolt and ensure that support from Albania was effectively blocked.

Currently, the Yugoslav Army (YA) methodology is much the same and their presence in Kosovo includes the Pristina Corps which is headquartered in Pristina.

The Pristina Corps consists of the following basic units: an armored brigade, two motorized brigades, an artillery-missile regiment, and an anti-tank artillery-missile brigade.⁴⁶

It is believed that the majority of YA forces presently garrisoned in Kosovo were relocated to the province after withdrawal from Macedonia in 1991. The Yugoslav Army elements deployed throughout Kosovo receive orders via Pristina from the Serb-led Third Army located in Nis, Serbia. The total force structure for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia includes 113,900 active duty troops which include 43,000 conscripts.⁴⁷ These figures include ethnic Albanians who continue to be forcibly drafted into service with the Yugoslav Army. Many of these draftees were sent to

⁴⁵Vladimir Jovanovic, “Vision of Hell and Burnt Land,” April 26, 1996. Online. *Nasa Borba*, Belgrade, FRY, translated by MILS News, Skopje, Macedonia, May 6, 1996.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷“The Military Balance 1996/1997,” *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, London, 1996, p. 102.

fight in other areas of the former Yugoslavia prior to the 1995 Dayton Accords. Additionally, the YA maintains a reserve element of almost 400,000 personnel for mobilization during times of national emergency.⁴⁸

The recent rise in hostilities in Kosovo has made this region of Serbia a less than desirable duty station for Serb security forces. The majority of police and military personnel are recruited from a variety of different areas outside of Kosovo. Many of the personnel currently serving in the region were trying to avoid service in the army, especially when the Serbs were fighting in Croatia. Military personnel and police officers that receive orders to Kosovo usually do not consider their duty station a path to future promotion. The Serb security establishment has a frustrating and rather overwhelming task of trying to control the almost two million ethnic Albanians. This frustration has often been transferred into brutal action when dealing with the unwieldy hostile population. Ethnic crimes common to other areas of the former Yugoslavia have also permeated the atmosphere in Kosovo. The harassment of ethnic Albanians by the military and police has reached unprecedented levels.

The Serb dominated Kosovo police force continues to be heavily armed and patrols Kosovo intimidating Albanians on a regular basis. This intimidation is similar to the Cubrilovic - Rankovic strategy alluded to earlier. In February of 1997, the pro-Milosevic Belgrade daily, *Politika Ekspres*, reported that a 30 year old ethnic Albanian died while in the custody of Serb security forces. The Albanian community expressed strong feelings that this prisoner was tortured to death by Serb security

⁴⁸“The Military Balance 1996/1997,” p. 102.

forces. The police have related that the individual committed suicide after admitting to membership in the Liberation Army of Kosovo.⁴⁹ There were five UCK members arrested and charged with planning terrorist activities over the 1997 May Day holiday. These arrests have come in the wake of a police “round-up” of numerous alleged members of the Liberation Army of Kosovo.

A savage and pathological instance of ethnic hatred is that of a police officer slashing a Serbian symbol on the chest of an 18 year old Albanian.⁵⁰

The notorious Serbian bank robber and war criminal Zeljko Raznjatovic, known as Arkan, was elected a deputy in Kosovo. He has rather openly advocated ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in an effort to defeat the Albanian separatist movement.⁵¹ Arkan’s Volunteer Guard known as the Tigers have deployed to Kosovo in what may be a move to control the black market in the region.⁵² The aforementioned incidents have been included as a small sample of the type of police action that occurs daily in Kosovo.

Those tortured or beaten by the police have little recourse in Kosovo as the rule of law is practically nonexistent.⁵³

⁴⁹ Patrick Moore, “Mysterious Death in Kosovo Prison,” *OMRI Daily Digest*, February, 27, 1997. (<http://www.omri.cz>)

⁵⁰Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, p. 96., *See *Amnesty International*, September, 1994.

⁵¹Biberaj, p. 1.

⁵²Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1997, p. 186.

⁵³“Open Wounds,” *Human Rights Watch/Helsinki*, New York, N.Y., March, 1993, p. xiii.

It is important to acknowledge that Serb police forces do in fact tolerate some parallel activities of ethnic Albanians, and even permit human rights organizations to exist.⁵⁴ However, it is quite possible that there is a perception of toleration, as certainly the security forces cannot maintain constant supervision over all aspects of the vast Albanian majority. Human rights organizations such as *Amnesty International* and Helsinki's *Human Rights Watch* report annually on human rights violations in the province.

The leadership in Belgrade has not limited its repression of Albanians to simply military and police action to maintain control in Kosovo.

Serbian officials resettled refugees in Kosovo, often against their will and in defiance of warnings from the international community that the newcomers could provoke the Albanian majority.⁵⁵

These refugees were from war ravaged areas of Bosnia and the Krajina region of Croatia. The Serb refugees have shown no desire to be Milosevic's instrument for ethnic balance in Kosovo. In June of this year, several Serb families that were resettled in Kosovo went on a hunger strike in Belgrade to protest Milosevic.

The Serbs demanded apartments and other social benefits that they say the authorities promised them in 1991. The government settled the families in Istok, Kosovo after they fled their homes in Slovenia and Croatia.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, p. 117.

⁵⁵ Julie Mertus, "A Wall of Silence," *Transition*, March 22, 1996, p. 48.

⁵⁶ *OMRI Daily Digest*, "Kosovo Serbs Launch Hunger Strike," June 12, 1997, p. 5.

Interestingly, Milosevic's Belgrade regime continues to receive tremendous pressure from minority Serb parties such as the Serbian Civic Alliance (GSS). This organization has openly protested the ill-treatment of Albanian detainees and expressed its concern about the potential for suffering among the innocent.⁵⁷

B. EXCLUSION IN EDUCATION

It is evident through the protests of resettled Serbs that the Milosevic-sponsored Serb control over the region has not solved Kosovo's problems. Belgrade has not reversed the educational problems, economic stagnation, or the backward nature of the region. Police repression has not improved the conditions for Kosovo and only appears to restrict vital social and economic progress required for the survival of all inhabitants.

Exclusionary measures in the field of education have done irreparable damage to progress in the province. The Serb leadership in Belgrade closed schools and revoked the Kosovar's right to pursue an education upon the introduction of a new decree in 1991.

The new uniform program and curricula resulted in the closing down of the Educational Administration of Kosovo, of the Kosovo Text-Book Publishing Institute and of other institutions and facilities in the field of education.⁵⁸

Serb police forces arrested large numbers of intellectuals. This was part of an effort to

⁵⁷Kosovo Information Center, "Minor Serb Party Protests Brutality Against Albanian Detainees in Kosovo," No. 1079, February 20, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-02-20.ksv.html>

⁵⁸"The Field of Education," Kosovo Albanians I, Online. Humanitarian Law Center, *Spotlight Report No. 6*, August 1993.

decapitate any potential revolutionary movement that might be led by educated ethnic Albanians. Former military officers were also included, as they supposedly had the type of training to organize such insurrections.⁵⁹

The independent ethnic Albanian education system in Kosovo was eliminated after the revocation of autonomy in Kosovo. A new curriculum eliminated Albanian language instruction and was oriented more toward the study of Serb culture.⁶⁰

Many Albanian teachers refused to recognize the new curriculum and, as a result, Serbian authorities began demanding that teachers sign a loyalty oath. When most of the teachers refused to sign, they were dismissed.⁶¹

The changes in the field of education made by the Milosevic administration have only served to restrict progress in Kosovo. The majority of the population has no state sponsored structure for elementary or secondary school education. Certainly, this will not cure problems of economic stagnation and ethnic conflict. These wasteful measures are an amazing failure to train Europe's fastest growing population for future mobilization in the workforce. By current standards, the economic gap between Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans will continue to expand and may result in the future decay of Serbia's financial status.

The Albanian population, under Dr. Ibrahim Rugova's leadership, has worked to establish a parallel school system. Kosovars have established schools in their homes

⁵⁹“Open Wounds,” p. xiii.

⁶⁰Ibid, p. 112.

⁶¹Ibid.

and secured the use of some academic facilities so as to hold class. Rugova was even able to negotiate an education accord that would allow the unconditional return of all ethnic Albanian students to all school premises and the University of Pristina.⁶²

Unfortunately, the Milosevic regime has simply refused to implement the September 1996 agreement. This action is typical of Milosevic's political maneuvering. It appears he only signed the accord with Rugova to show the international community that he was capable of concessions, but like with so many other agreements, Milosevic has failed to keep his word.

C. CONTROL OF THE MEDIA

Since 1990, Kosovars have had their ability to communicate via television, radio, and newspaper manipulated by the Serb regime in Belgrade. All ethnic Albanian broadcasting was closed down and any future development of ethnic Albanian programming has been discouraged. Specifically, Radio and Television of Pristina was closed by Serb police and the staff was dismissed.⁶³ Currently, the only radio and television programs that are broadcast in the Albanian language are those translated from Serb programs. Kosovars feel that the aforementioned Serb programming is simply propaganda. However, Belgrade claims that Serbia has accommodated its minorities through the translated programming. Furthermore, Serb

⁶²Kosovo Information Center, "Unimplemented Education Accord - Exemplary, According to Serbian Prime Minister," No. 1208, *Kosovo Daily Report*.

⁶³Kosovo Information Center, "The Media, Publishing, Culture," No. 1024, December 3, 1996. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/96-12-03_1.ksv.html

leadership contends that there are no barriers in place that prevent ethnic Albanian television and radio stations from being established in Kosovo.

The Secretary of Information says that he has had no requests for the creation of new television and radio stations in Kosovo. Albanian leaders cite economic difficulties as the main barrier to attempting to establish a new station.⁶⁴

Newspapers were not immune from Serb influence either, as ethnic Albanian journalists were fired and their periodicals reconfigured to meet new standards. Currently, there are two remaining independent papers that serve the province of Kosovo. These ethnic Albanian papers appear to be limited to only weekly distribution. *Koha* is the most prominent political weekly and has attracted the finest journalists.⁶⁵ The other two prominent papers are *Zeri* which is an independent weekly written in Albanian and *Bujku* which is the most influential newspaper for Kosovars.⁶⁶ Additionally, foreign journals are not sold openly in Kosovo for fear of police harassment.⁶⁷ The strict control of Serbia's borders probably does not allow for the entry of sizable amounts of foreign material beyond that which is successfully smuggled into the region.

The bitter, and perhaps cynical, outcome of the media situation in Kosovo is that many of the still existing Albanian papers are not as fully critical of the self proclaimed Albanian authorities as they might have been under other circumstances.⁶⁸

⁶⁴"Open Wounds," p. 102.

⁶⁵"Media in Kosovo," *Press Now Dossier*. Online. No date.

⁶⁶*Ibid*.

⁶⁷"Open Wounds," p. 103.

⁶⁸"Media in Kosovo," *Press Now Dossier*, Online. No date.

Sadly, this intense state control over the media exists not just in Kosovo, but throughout Serbia. The inability to have access to an independent, relatively non-biased news network during the age of information, is paralyzing not just Kosovars, but also Serbia. The constraints placed on the media have stifled the free flow of ideas that contribute to progress in the society. Open lines of communication are vital to relations in Kosovo because they provide a medium for understanding. The failure to communicate effectively has driven Orthodox Christian Serbs and ethnic Albanians further apart over the last six years aggravating an historically volatile relationship. The restoration of an unrestricted media would certainly help to dissolve the information barrier that has been in place since 1990.

D. ETHNIC ALBANIAN UNEMPLOYMENT

Mass layoffs in the Kosovar work force have essentially stripped ethnic Albanians of their ability to support their large extended families. It was alluded to earlier that the Serbs have failed to provide an atmosphere conducive to educating Europe's fastest growing population. Instead, over eighty percent of Albanians who worked in the public sector in Kosovo have lost their jobs and were replaced by Serbs since 1990.⁶⁹ Many of these Albanians have returned to an agrarian lifestyle and struggle to survive. The most common Serb explanation for the large scale ethnic Albanian unemployment is as follows:

⁶⁹Kosovo Information Center, "Kosovo, A Nation Struggling to Break Free From Serbian Occupation, Employment and Health-care," No. 1024, December 3, 1996. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/96-12-03_1.ksv.html

The Albanians are refusing to use their rights and a large number of ethnic Albanians have wilfully abandoned their enterprises and government institutions, obviously in response to the orders of their secessionist leaders.⁷⁰

It is true that many Kosovars have continued to serve in their government occupations. Sadly, most of these individuals, regardless of true intentions, have been labeled filthy collaborators who are loyal only to the Serb regime. Certainly, this is a problem because it stands in the way of rectifying Kosovo's tremendous employment crisis. There are many Kosovars who refuse to accept jobs that are "outside" of the recently established "parallel system," as to do so would be to indicate defacto recognition of the Serb regime.

The absence of Kosovars from the workplace has had a profound impact on the ability to sustain an effective health care program in Kosovo. The medical profession has faced a stiff uphill battle to acquire properly trained personnel. The loss of state sponsored health care has created a dangerous situation for the rapidly expanding population. The inability to acquire medical supplies, trained personnel, and appropriate facilities has had an adverse effect on the population physically and psychologically.

Serbian law officially allows for the operation of private health care facilities that are properly registered pursuant to the relevant regulations. According to many Albanian physicians, however, permits for private institutions are issued in a highly selective and discriminatory manner. Clinics are in continuous danger of being closed by Serbian authorities, and their staffs in danger of being harassed and detained by police.⁷¹

⁷⁰Kosovo Information Center, "Kosovo, A Nation Struggling to Break Free From Serbian Occupation, Employment and Health-care," No. 1024, December 3, 1996.

⁷¹"Open Wounds," p. 128.

The problems in the health care profession poignantly illustrate that as long as Kosovars are restricted from leadership positions in Kosovo, the great divide between the two ethnic groups will continue to expand. This divide is problematic in that it has the potential to create an unhealthy permanent Serb dominance and an improper balance in the society.

Historically, both Serbs and Kosovars have endured the pain of one ethnic group dominating the other until an independent external force changes the situation. An external force has been designed by the international community to “change” the deplorable situation in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the Dayton agreement and its participants that brokered the cessation of hostilities failed to address Kosovo. The peace accords did not recognize Kosovo as the catalyst for the current conflict and the possible origin for another Balkan war.

U.S. policy had quietly shifted to the position that Kosovo was an internal affair of Serbia, just as it accepted that the independence movement in Chechnya was a Russian internal affair. Efforts to defend the aggrieved and abused human rights of Albanians remained declarations only.⁷²

The NATO led Stabilization Force (SFOR) has been assigned the very task of implementing the peace agreement or “changing” the situation in Bosnia. The international community has related that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Serb leaders are keenly aware of international opinion and have continued their volatile

⁷²Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 399.

campaign to stifle Kosovars through police violence, counterproductive education reform, control of the media, and discrimination in the workplace.

IV. THE KOSOVAR OPPOSITION

On one hand, Serbian authorities tolerate the “parallel” and pro-Kosovo activities of Albanians, allowing even Albanian human rights organizations to exist. On the other hand, Serbian authorities keep a tight lid on Albanian aspirations for independence through a program of forced displacement, harassment, arrest, interrogation, and torture.⁷³

A. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARLIAMENT

Traditionally, ethnic Albanian political parties in Kosovo have not been very well organized. The first Albanian attempt to organize an opposition to Serb domination was the League of Prizren established in 1878. The League of Prizren was a weak nationalist movement that attempted to unite the ethnic Albanian population in Southeastern Europe. Their goal was to build a “Greater Albania.” Ironically, it was the most recent onset of Serb repression that led the Albanians to organize politically, as they were previously unable to express their interests with even the smallest degree of solidarity. However, Serb security forces have not permitted Kosovar legislators to govern in an open manner. They have attempted to arrest anyone trying to attend pre-planned political gatherings or rallies. The aforementioned has made elections and governing the region a particularly challenging endeavor.

The 1989 revocation of autonomy in Kosovo triggered the campaign to establish the province as an independent republic. The majority of the legislators in the Kosovo Assembly and provincial government was ethnic Albanian and voted for

⁷³“Open Wounds, p. xiii.

independence. The Serb response was to suspend the Kosovo Assembly and this action led to the establishment of the underground government. These former members of the provincial government do not participate in federal and republic elections. The ethnic Albanian population forgoes the opportunity for representation when it does not pursue seats in the Yugoslav Federal Assembly. This non-participation is essential to the Republic of Kosovo's declaration of independence. The smallest degree of participation would indicate an acceptance of Belgrade's rule over the region.

The parliament has never been able to convene as an entire legislative body. Members of parliament have met in secret to discuss initiatives and "govern" the province. This inability to work in an open forum has had a detrimental effect on the organizational aspect of the Albanian resistance. The Serbs tolerate the existence of this *unseen* government largely because of its invisibility. Additionally, Belgrade has been under the watchful eye of the international community since the outset of hostilities in 1989. Although the focus was certainly on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgrade was still forced to deal with the international pressure of economic sanctions.

1. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)

The leader of the ethnic Albanian struggle for reform in Kosovo is Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. A poet, university professor, and former head of the Kosovo Writers Association, Rugova has worked particularly hard to present Kosovar interests throughout the international community. He founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in 1990 and was elected president of the Republic of Kosovo in 1992.

Dr. Rugova is extremely popular and his non-violent approach has won him attention from world leaders. It is this peaceful approach that has provided him with an international audience and a high level of respect from the international community. Currently, Albania remains the only country that has officially recognized Kosovo's independence.

It is Rugova's goal, together with the LDK, to draw as much international attention to the plight of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo as possible. It was in September of 1991 that the former Albanian dominated Kosovo Assembly sponsored an unofficial campaign to make Kosovo a sovereign and independent state. Apparently, the majority of the voting conducted for this referendum on independence was done in private homes to avoid Serbian police. The ethnic Albanians living in rural areas of Kosovo did not share the same concerns as urban residents with regard to police surveillance and this facilitated a slightly more public style of voting in the countryside.

The second organized function was an election held in May of 1992 in an effort to elect a new parliament and a president to represent their interests. Rugova and the LDK were overwhelmingly swept into power as the new democratically elected Kosovar leadership. There was no effort to monitor the elections by the European community or the United Nations.⁷⁴ The Kosovars were hoping that an independent international presence would discourage Serb efforts to disrupt the event.

⁷⁴Charles J. Brown, "Keeping it Safe for Serbia," *Freedom Review*, Vol. 23, No. 25, September-October, 1992, p. 24.

A law had been established prior to the elections by the pre-election parliament in exile and provided for the following:

The law guaranteed suffrage to all Kosovars eighteen or older, promised a secret ballot, and outlined eligibility rules for candidates. It also established independent electoral commissions to monitor voter registration, ballot security, and vote tabulation.⁷⁵

Charles J. Brown, author of *Keeping it Safe for Serbia*, was present in Kosovo during the elections and offered the following in his article: “In every precinct save one, over ninety percent of those eligible voted.” Brown goes on to relate that a massive media presence helped to quell violence, but Serb security forces still managed to harass voters and poll volunteers. The Serb police left Rugova alone and chose to go after the lower level “lieutenants” of the underground movement. It appears the Kosovars were prepared for the Serb harassment, as they shifted their polling places to less public areas. This seems to be the primary method for doing political business in Kosovo. The Kosovars avoid large public gatherings that would be a lot more efficient, but clearly a lot less safe.

There were 490 candidates pursuing 130 seats for the underground parliament and Ibrahim Rugova was uncontested in his bid for the presidency in 1992.⁷⁶ The LDK won a majority with 96 seats during this election. The Parliamentary Party originally won 13 seats and have recently increased this number, the Peasant and Christian Democratic Parties each won 7 seats, the Party of Democratic Action earned

⁷⁵Brown, p. 24.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 25.

1 seat, there were 2 seats that went to independent candidates, and finally 14 seats were reserved for Serbs.⁷⁷ Naturally, the Serb authorities in Kosovo refused to recognize the elections as legal and have continued to maintain the view that all legitimate political power stems from Belgrade.

President Ibrahim Rugova represents only one of the many competing Albanian political parties that comprise the parliament and underground government. Rugova's party, the Democratic League of Kosovo, has traditionally expressed staunch support of the movement for an independent Kosovo. The LDK rejected a March 1997 offer to discuss Kosovar autonomy within Serbia. This offer originated with Slobodan Milosevic's Zajedno opposition. Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister and a close associate of Rugova, represents the Republic of Kosovo on the international scene and personally rejected the Serb opposition's offer. Recently, frustrated Kosovars have shifted some allegiance to the largest minority opposition to the LDK, the Parliamentary Party.

2. Kosovar Political Parties (Minority)

There is an array of political parties that also represent ethnic Albanian interests in the Kosovar parliament. These organizations are important, as they demonstrate an expansion in the overall participation of ethnic Albanians in political events. However, they also indicate that the Albanian opposition is somewhat fractured with a number of

⁷⁷Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 7 June 1992 trans. in FBIS-EEU-92-110, 8 June 1992, p. 57, quoted by Elez Biberaj, "Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg," *Conflict Studies* 258, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, The United Kingdom, February 1993, p. 3.

viewpoints on Kosovo's future. A divergence of opinion could serve to weaken the Kosovar efforts which could in turn lead to a breakdown in the governing apparatus.

The aforementioned development of smaller political parties and action groups is a clear indication of the frustration that exists in the region. The lack of progress toward a better livelihood has driven some Kosovars to shift their loyalty to other organizations. Additionally, the underground parliamentary leadership representing Kosovar interests has begun to question and even alter their demands. The Parliamentary Party (PPK) under the leadership of Adem Demaci represents the most extreme shift in Kosovar demands.

a. The Parliamentary Party (PPK)

The Parliamentary Party (PPK) is led by human rights activist, Adem Demaci. Mr. Demaci is often referred to as the "Albanian Nelson Mandela." This individual spent over 28 years in prison before his 1990 release.⁷⁸ Adem Demaci and his party now control about 57 of the 130 seats in parliament. His political goal in the future is to pursue the presidential position that now belongs to Rugova. An additional 9 seats for a total of 66 would allow Demaci to achieve his presidential ambition.

The Parliamentary Party differs from the Democratic League of Kosovo because it has recently advocated accepting *less* than an independent republic. Specifically, Kosovo would essentially have the same status as Montenegro. Montenegro has its own constitution and is supposed to be an equal member of the

⁷⁸ Fabian Schmidt, "Protests in Serbia Raise Hopes of Reconciliation in Kosovo," *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 4., March 7, 1997.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). However, Milosevic's Serbia has a substantial degree of power over Montenegro that isn't found in any of the three existing constitutions. Furthermore, Demaci has expressed strong opposition to any plan that calls for a return to the autonomous status Kosovo enjoyed under the 1974 constitution. It is quite likely that Kosovo, as an "equal" republic within the FRY, would not be entirely free of Serb dominance. This absence of Kosovar independence makes the Demaci plan a little hard to swallow.

It is important to emphasize that Demaci is an individual with a strong personal desire to replace Ibrahim Rugova. He has firmly criticized Rugova and his policies, but does not appear to be able to offer an acceptable replacement. His controversial Balkania (Kosovo's association with Montenegro and Serbia) solution for the region has received strong criticism from his own Parliamentary Party and other political organizations in Kosovo.

b. The Albanian Christian Democratic Party (PSHDK)

The Albanian Christian Democratic Party (PSHDK) is led by Dr. Krasniqi and Tadej Rodiqi. Krasniqi is a well-respected leader in Kosovo and appears to be increasing his personal political power base. The PSHDK holds the 1991 referendum on Kosovar independence and sovereignty sacred. This organization feels strongly that the 1991 legislation is the only mandate that Kosovar leaders have with which to govern the Republic of Kosovo.⁷⁹ Furthermore, Krasniqi is against the

⁷⁹Kosova Information Center, "Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania, Demaci says," No. 1109, April 3, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-04-03.ksv.html>

independent action of individuals attempting to arrange secret meetings to further political goals.⁸⁰

Krasniqi has been outspoken on a host of issues relating to the plight of Albanians in the Balkans, but he has not been able to win more than three percent of the vote. The PSHDK condemned the Macedonian Special Police for instituting a campaign of vandalism directed against the Albanian population in Macedonia.⁸¹ Krasniqi and the PSHDK feel that the greatest point of departure amongst the Albanian political parties is the referendum of the people, as a sanctified act of democratic expression.⁸² Finally, the vocal PSHDK leader reiterated his unswerving position on Kosovo's independence during a Pristina press conference this summer. Dr. Krasniqi has stated that any arrangement within Serbia or the FRY is unacceptable.

c. The Social Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSDK)

The Social Democratic Party of Kosovo is currently led by Luljeta Pula-Beqiri and Dr. Besim Bokshi. The PSDK is composed of two factions and has

⁸⁰Kosovo Information Center, "Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania, Demaci says." It is important to note that there is a host of smaller political parties not included in this discussion. These organizations are in the development stage and include, but are not limited to, the Albanian National Democratic Party (PNDSH), the National Unity Party (UNIKOMB), and the Peasants Party of Kosova (PFK). Although certainly important in expressing Kosovar interests, these parties are not well established and have little or no representation in the underground parliament.

⁸¹Kosovo Information Center, "Kosovar Political Parties Denounce FYROM Crackdown on Albanians," No. 1181, July 10, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-07-10.ksv.html>

⁸²Kosovo Information Center, "Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania, Demaci says."

expressed dismay with the international community's reluctance to recognize Kosovo as an independent republic. The Kosovo Information Center (KIC) reported that Pula-Beqiri had expressed concern and criticized U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum in a formal letter written earlier this year. It appears that Pula-Beqiri was reacting to a Kornblum statement that Kosovo must seek the solution to its problems through Serbia. Additionally, this party strongly opposed the June 1997 elections in neighboring Albania. Specifically, the PSDK considered the elections: "Neither free, nor fair, nor acceptable."⁸³ This criticism of the new Albanian government conflicts directly with the praise and congratulatory remarks that were offered by Ibrahim Rugova and the LDK. Additionally, the criticism is indicative of the increasing divisions within the Kosovar opposition and the expression of a mixed message.

d. The Liberal Party of Kosovo (PLK)

Gjergj Dedaj represents the Liberal Party of Kosovo (PLK) which is an organization that stands for an independent and neutral Kosovo. The PLK shares the same concerns regarding the 1991 referendum on independence as the PSHDK and other Kosovar political parties. Mr. Dedaj staunchly opposes the "Balkania" plan that PPK leader Adem Demaci has tried to market throughout the region. Furthermore, he has related that neutral status is a compromise.⁸⁴ This particular arrangement would

⁸³Kosovo Information Center, "PSDK Calls Election in Albanian Neither Free, Nor Fair, Nor Acceptable," No. 1177, July 4, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-07-04.ksv.html>

⁸⁴Kosovo Information Center, "Independence and Neutrality, the Only Viable Solution for Kosova, PLK Leader says, No. 1089, June 3, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*.

allow Kosovo to be open to both Serbia and Albania for diplomatic relations in the future.

The PLK has shown particular sensitivity toward relations with Albania. Dedaj views Kosovo as under occupation by the Milosevic regime and he is determined in his efforts to convey this message to both Belgrade and Tirana. The PLK and other Kosovar political parties are concerned with the change of command in Albania. Sali Berisha, a “Gheg” and the former President of Albania, was courted by the Kosovars as a sympathetic ally.

3. The Parliament, Passive Resistance, and Frustration

The inability to convene their parliament in mass, the absence of large scale *tangible* international support, and a dual party structure with differing goals has served to weaken the Albanians’ effort against Belgrade. However, Ibrahim Rugova continues to lobby the United States and Western European countries for support. The U.S. State Department opened an Information Center in Kosovo, but it is very limited in its diplomatic functions. Furthermore, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Belgrade has informed Rugova that the U.S. does not support independence. Additionally, Sali Berisha’s Albanian government was the only institution in the international community to actually recognize Kosovo’s “underground state.” Western countries may fear a repeat of the recent Balkan hostilities that commenced shortly after international recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia.

The underground parliament was due for an election in May of this year, but all elections were postponed by Rugova until December of 1997. Despite

overwhelming support for Rugova, the opposition to him views the postponement of elections as a plot on behalf of the President to stay in power. The reason for the postponement of the parliamentary elections was rather vague, but it appears that de-confliction with scheduled elections in Serbia was paramount in Rugova's decision.⁸⁵ The fall elections may change the Kosovar opposition's approach from the Rugova-led independence movement to settling for a Demaci-sponsored "Balkania" plan. The opposing views of Kosovar leadership, as alluded to above, have not made for the most effective resistance to the Serbs. The Rugova government's concept of peaceful resistance to Serb domination has produced almost no visible results for Albanians.

In a recent interview with Ibrahim Rugova, Timothy Ash discussed at great length the increasing ethnic Albanian frustration with the shadow state. Rugova related that the Albanian parliament had worked to set up an independent university and a health care organization named after Mother Theresa, an ethnic Albanian born in Macedonia.⁸⁶ Although, more than eighteen thousand school teachers are currently funded by dues that are paid to the underground regime, these dues are paid in addition to the normal Serb government taxes. There is some international relief as suggested by the Kosovo Information Center, but double taxation imparts additional hardship on an already fatigued and impoverished Albanian population. This tired

⁸⁵Kosovo Information Center, "Summary from President Rugova's Press Conference," No. 1137, May 9, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*.

⁸⁶Timothy Garton Ash, "In the Serbian Soup," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 44, No. 7, April 24, 1997, p. 28.

Kosovar population is keenly aware that it has been almost six years since Rugova came to power and there is still no significant change in their status.

The former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, Mr. Warren Zimmerman, was quoted as saying: "Kosovo has not exploded, which was something analysts expected in the late 80's and early 90's, owing to the passive (unarmed) resistance the Kosovo Albanians have pursued."⁸⁷ However, Kosovos' Albanians have become frustrated with the perceived lack of progress and some have abandoned the practice of peaceful resistance.

The Ghandi-style methods of resistance applied in public by the Albanian separatist movement have not resulted in a strong enough internationalization of the Kosovo issue, so that also terrorism is growing roots in Kosovo and Metohija, as an often resorted to means of political struggle in the so-called hopeless situations.⁸⁸

B. THE ARMED ETHNIC ALBANIAN OPPOSITION

The shift from civil disobedience to the use of terrorism as a means of expression is indicative of Kosovar impatience with their predicament. The Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) surfaced in the spring of 1996 with a series of brutal attacks on Serb officials. These organizations offer an alternative for those tired of Rugova's policies. The terrorist attacks have been extremely effective in capturing international attention. The

⁸⁷Kosovo Information Center, "Passive Resistance of Albanians Has Prevented Kosova from Exploding, Zimmerman Says," No. 839, March 21, 1996. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. Available <http://kosova@gn.apc.org>

⁸⁸Milivoje Mihajlovic, "Kosovo Today," *Serbia Bulletin*, September 1996. Online. No date. Available <http://www.yugoslavia.com>

global news networks do not seem to report the extensive political maneuvering associated with the movement, as much as the terrorist activities executed by the UCK. The strategy of the Liberation Army of Kosovo does not appear much different from that employed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

Unfortunately, there is not a lot of information available regarding the structure of this terrorist group. However, the tactics and doctrine of this organization can be traced through an examination of the many violent anti-Serb acts that have become increasingly common. Members of the UCK are most likely experienced military personnel that have received some type of professional training. It is important to note that a significant level of progression appears evident in the Kosovar terrorist movement. The sophistication of explosive devices utilized have evolved to the point where remote detonation is now possible. The frequency of the attacks and total number killed has more than doubled after one year of “visible” existence. Additionally, the targets have broadened from Serb authorities to ethnic Albanians perceived as collaborators. This progression marks an escalation in violence not seen in recent years and could spark the end of peaceful resistance.

Ibrahim Rugova and the ethnic Albanian leadership have tried to distance themselves as much as possible from terrorism, but do not appear to openly condemn the violent action that has been taken in recent years.⁸⁹ Rugova fears losing international respect by being associated with terrorists and blames Serb authorities for

⁸⁹Mihajlovic, “Kosovo Today,” Online.

staging the attacks. However, it is rather unlikely that the UCK and LKCK are Serb efforts to fowl the opposition in their effort to gain control in Kosovo.

1. The Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK)

The Liberation Army of Kosovo first emerged in February of 1996 with a series of bomb attacks on selected Serb targets. These targets were rather random at first, but it appears that they centered on the homes of Serb refugees, automobiles, and government facilities. Traditionally, the group has utilized small arms to include automatic weapons and hand grenades.⁹⁰ The stated goal of the group has been strict independence for Kosovo through the aggravation of regional tension.⁹¹

It was by the Spring of 1996 that the UCK began to pursue a more lethal approach with Serb policemen as their primary target. In the month of April the UCK killed four people outside an open café by spraying the area with automatic weapons fire. This incident occurred approximately sixty miles west of Pristina at a restaurant frequented by Serb authorities.⁹² An array of arrests followed the wave of terrorism, but violent incidents continued rather unimpeded throughout the year. The arrests did not deter or prevent ethnic Albanians from using terrorism in Kosovo in their struggle against Serb dominance. The typical Serb response to the terrorist actions has been to

⁹⁰Fabian Schmidt, "Mysterious Kosovo Liberation Army on Still on the Move," No. 44, November 5, 1996. Online. Pursuing Balkan Peace. *Open Media Research Institute*. Available <http://www.emgmks.com/news/omri/balkpeace.htm>

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Berserkistan in Bosnia, "Four Killed in Kosovo Shootout," Ethnic Albanian Tensions Run High in Southern Serbia," Online. June 5, 1997. Available <http://www.linder.com/beserk/kosovo.html>

crack down on the ethnic Albanian population with public trials for the alleged terrorists. The defense lawyers for individuals on trial often claim that their clients were physically tortured into confessing involvement with terrorism.

The Kosovo Liberation Army claimed responsibility for killing a civilian and a Serb policeman near the village of Podujevo in October of 1996. It has become evident that the most common way for the UCK to claim responsibility for such acts is by faxing messages to the media for broadcast on the local news.⁹³ However, there appears to be some reluctance by the Albanian press to report on the UCK. Ethnic Albanian leaders have felt that international condemnation of terrorism has the potential to adversely effect the entire opposition movement. Rugova has repeatedly stated his distaste for terrorism and declared his commitment to peaceful resistance. Apparently, the communiques claiming responsibility for the attacks were sent through the Swiss Confederation.⁹⁴ An Italian journalist, Alberto Negri, interviewed a Kosovo Liberation Army spokesman in Tirana, Albania. The individual related the specifics on how the UCK communicates with the outside world from its secret Pristina headquarters. Additionally, this UCK spokesman showed the Italian journalist a copy of the clandestine newspaper known as "Clirimi" or "freedom."

⁹³Kosovo Information Center, "UCK Claims Responsibility for Killings, Serb Paramilitary Organization Threatens to Hit Back," No. 1056, January 21, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-01-21/ksv.html>

⁹⁴Milan Il Sole-24 Ore (Italian), February 13, 1997, p. 3, trans in FBIS-TOT-97-021-L, February 27, 1997.

The murders of several individuals in early January of 1997 exemplified a change in UCK tactics. Specifically, the targeted population was expanded to include ethnic Albanians. Furthermore, the attacks were executed with a much higher degree of sophistication. It was during this time that the UCK claimed responsibility for the separate killings of two ethnic Albanian men who were alleged Serb loyalists. These incidents were followed by an attack on the Serb rector of the University of Pristina.⁹⁵ The educator was not killed in this bomb attack that rocked the school's Serb leadership, but the incident created a climate of fear that was unparalleled since the birth of the opposition movement.

The car bomb was rather sophisticated, as it was remotely controlled to detonate just as the vehicle passed the explosives.⁹⁶ This particular terrorist incident is indicative of a much higher degree of training than the UCK previously displayed. Although not as deadly as other UCK related actions, this startling event directed international attention toward Kosovo. James Walsh in his article, "The Next Balkan Crisis," offers the following regarding the incident.

If that was a UCK act, it raises the ante considerably, declared a Western diplomat in Belgrade who pointed out that such provocations could lead to martial law, the Yugoslav army activated, police checkpoints, all of which could spillover to Macedonia with its own Albanian minority.⁹⁷

⁹⁵Gjeraqina Tuhina, "Out of the Shadows," War Report 49. Online. *The Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, 1997.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷James Walsh, "The Next Balkan Crisis," Vol. 149, No. 8, February 24, 1997. Online. *Time*. No date.

In March of this year, OMRI's *Daily Digest* reported that four people were injured in the bombing of a Serbian monument to Serb language reformer Vuk Karadzic near the university. Additionally, a Serb policeman was shot five times at a restaurant café. The targeting of Pristina University and areas that contain Serbian cultural monuments agitated Serb officials who have an overwhelming presence in urban areas.

A series of killings during the month of April reinforced the belief that terrorists would not hesitate to kill Kosovars that were thought to be collaborators. The UCK claimed it killed Ramiz Leka, a Milosevic loyalist and an ethnic Albanian. The killing of perceived Albanian collaborators by the UCK multiplied an already high level of fear that continues to permeate the entire region.

In May, two Serb policemen were shot to death and one ethnic Albanian was murdered in hostilities between the UCK and Serb officials. Additionally, an extremely large mob of college students in Pristina staged a demonstration to protest the arrest of alleged ethnic Albanian terrorists. The public outcry regarding the incidents and subsequent arrests actually completes the UCK mission. Confusion that has the potential to lead to a mobilization of the large ethnic Albanian population, is a step toward success for the UCK.

Chris Hedges's *New York Times* article: "Resistance to Serbia Turns Violent in Kosovo," is based primarily on an interview with an ethnic Albanian referred to as "Alban," who claims to be a leader of the UCK. Hedges reports that the organization receives political and financial support from the ethnic Albanian population.

Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the UCK receives money and training from Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.⁹⁸ UCK terrorists appear to be cautious in selecting their targets and use more sophisticated means for which to kill these targets.⁹⁹

Although certainly an overestimation of the armed opposition, Serb officials believe that there may be as many as 40,000 Muslim terrorists who fought in Bosnia and are now supporting the ethnic Albanian cause in Kosovo.¹⁰⁰ However, it is unclear exactly which organization these Muslim volunteers may be serving and it is likely that the Serb estimate has been inflated to some degree. Training and financial support for these militant Islamic groups is expected to have originated in Pakistan or possibly Iran. The increase in terrorist activity may be coupled with an increase in the flow of arms into the region. The acquisition of weapons from Middle Eastern countries during the recent conflict in neighboring Bosnia was largely restricted by the International Community's sanctions. Nevertheless, it appears that weapons were able to reach those warring factions seeking them. The aforementioned weapons proliferation issue presents a threat to neighboring U.S. led NATO backed SFOR currently stationed in the Balkans. The expansion of terrorist activity and the

⁹⁸ "Hope, and Danger, for ethnic Albanians," *The Economist*, March 29, 1997.

⁹⁹ Fabian Schmidt, "Kosovo Liberation Army Launches New Offensive," *OMRI Analytical Briefs*, January 16, 1997, Vol. 1, No. 525. (<http://www.omri.cz>)

¹⁰⁰ Chris Hedges, "Resistance to Serbia Turns Violent in Kosovo," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1997.

proliferation of weapons is a threat to the multinational force that is trying to keep the peace in neighboring Bosnia.

2. The National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK)

The National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) is a small organization that does not support Ibrahim Rugova's passive resistance movement. Although this organization has taken a "back seat" to the aggressive Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK), it does exist and even publishes a bulletin.¹⁰¹ This movement is often confused with the UCK, but there does not appear to be an association with the type of terrorism common to the Liberation Army of Kosovo.

Apparently, the LKCK believes that the only acceptable solution to the problem is through a large-scale war with Serbia, as terrorism will not ensure freedom for ethnic Albanians.¹⁰² The LKCK appears to offer the extreme alternative to the Rugova approach. This movement may have appeal with frustrated elements of the population who are tired of the stagnant situation, but are opposed to the kind of terrorism advocated by the UCK. The tumultuous history of this Balkan territory is indicative of the challenge to security in the future. As alluded to earlier, violent protests and brutal crackdowns have become common to everyday life for the Kosovars. Finally, the LKCK is another example of the recent emergence of organizations that advocate fighting Serb rule with force.

¹⁰¹Gjeraqina Tuhina, "Out of the Shadows," War Report 49. Online. *The Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, 1997.

¹⁰²Tuhina, "Out of the Shadows," Online.

V. KOSOVO AND PROSPECTS FOR CRISIS RESOLUTION

Even if all-out war does not break out, the future is bleak. Ironically, in the wreckage of post-Tito Yugoslavia, it is the two peoples who loathed each other most of all who are still condemned to live together within the same state.¹⁰³

The conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is potentially lethal to regional stability. In fact, this volatile situation has explosive possibilities for all of Southeastern Europe. Specifically, ethnic violence originating in Kosovo has the potential to involve ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Albania. An escalation in violence could include U.S. forces deployed in Macedonia as part of a United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) force. The spread of hostilities into the aforementioned border states could result in the involvement of Greece, Turkey, Romania, Hungary, and even Bulgaria.

There appears to be an increasing sense of dissatisfaction with the ruling parties that currently control the former Communist Balkan states. Albanian and Serb leaders have increasingly come under fire in the wake of deteriorating standards of living. Anti-governmental protests have rocked both Belgrade and Tirana since the cessation of hostilities in 1995. In general, the Serbian populace appears to be showing more respect for human rights since the 1995 Dayton Accords. This shift in public opinion could improve the chances for a resolution of the Kosovo issue.¹⁰⁴ However, strong

¹⁰³Judah, p. 308.

¹⁰⁴Fabian Schmidt, "Protests in Serbia Raise Hopes of Reconciliation in Kosovo," *Transition*, March 7, 1997, Vol. 3, No. 4, Open Media Research Institute, p. 18.

Serb sentiment regarding Kosovo cannot be underestimated in future mediation of the conflict. Belgrade has maintained that Albanian separatism within the FRY remains an unacceptable option.

There is an array of scenarios that must be examined when attempting to assess the future of Kosovo. These include, but are not limited to, the following: the concept of a greater Albania, an independent Kosovo, an intensified federalization of the FRY, a reestablishment of autonomy, the partitioning of the province, ethnic war, and a maintenance of the status quo.¹⁰⁵

A. KOSOVO, A GREATER ALBANIA, AND BALKAN BORDERS

The conflict in Kosovo has increasingly become a more visible issue in Albania over the past six years. Milosevic's decision to withdraw Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989 and the subsequent birth of the modern opposition movement sparked an intense effort by Kosovars to obtain external support. The radical changes in the region and the brutal warfare in other areas of the former Yugoslavia attracted Albanian attention to the plight of the Kosovars. Recently, Albanian Foreign Minister Paskal Milo related that, "Albania's government cannot negotiate in the name of Kosova."¹⁰⁶ He also went on to say, "If the problem of Kosova is not resolved on a realistic basis, there cannot be peace, understanding, and cooperation in the

¹⁰⁵Stefan Troebst, "Still Looking for an Answer to The Albanian Question," *Transition*, Vol. 3, No. 4, March 7, 1997, Open Media Research Institute, p. 25.

¹⁰⁶Kosovo Information Center, "Albania Cannot Negotiate in the Name of Kosova," No. 1234, September 18, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. September 19, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-09-18.ksv.html>

Balkans.”¹⁰⁷ Albania remains the only country to have formally recognized the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo.

1. Kosovars and Albanian Unification

It was alluded to earlier that a movement for a greater Albania was never truly initiated by Kosovars or Albanians. This is primarily because of the vast tribal, linguistic, and religious differences that exist among Albanians who remain scattered throughout the Balkans.

To most Albanians the concept of a Greater Albania, including Kosovo, is a myth or a dream rather than a possible geographic reality.¹⁰⁸

There is a history of hostility between ethnic Albanians residing in Kosovo and the multitude of powerful regimes that have governed Albania. Many Kosovars have concluded that the former Albanian Communist government led by Enver Hoxha essentially ignored the plight of ethnic Albanians in the region. It seems that it was never really in the interest of Albania to exacerbate relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia by siding with the Kosovars.

Albania and Yugoslavia were major trading partners by the 1980’s and there was some Serb fear of an Albanian campaign for a greater Albania.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, the political structures were quite different, which made unification rather unrealistic. Most Kosovars were farmers and owned their own land. This contrasted with

¹⁰⁷Kosovo Information Center, “Albania Cannot Negotiate in the Name of Kosova.”

¹⁰⁸Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, *Albania*, New York University Press, Washington Square, New York, 1997, p. 142.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p. 144.

Albania's Stalinist program of collectivization.¹¹⁰ Clearly, it was economically counterproductive for Albania to fight for Kosovar rights prior to 1989. However, Hoxha's extreme distaste for Yugoslavia led to his desire to use the Kosovars to make trouble for Tito.¹¹¹

Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in 1989 changed the relationship between Kosovo and Albania. The imposition of United Nations sanctions on Serbia was detrimental to the free flow of trade between the former Yugoslavia and Albania. Simultaneously, an unparalleled increase in human rights abuses directed against Kosovars shocked the majority of Albanians. A more open Albania that was no longer sheltered by Communism received reports of Milosevic's crack down on a regular basis. Milosevic's actions forced Albania to pay closer attention to the situation in Kosovo. Additionally, a few Albanian scholars saw the end of Communism and the establishment of new governments as a chance to finally solve the issue of Albanian nationalism.

Albanian leader Ramiz Alia, the successor to Enver Hoxha, ordered the publication of pamphlets and other materials that outlined the plight of the Kosovars.¹¹² Alia responded expeditiously to the growing Albanian distaste for the problems in Kosovo and tried to draw international attention to the Kosovars cause. Although

¹¹⁰Arshi Pipa, "The Political Situation Of The Albanians in Yugoslavia, With Particular Attention to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 1989, p. 163.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Vickers and Pettifer, p. 148.

Albania recognized Kosovo, it appears that it was equally important for the survival of an unstable Albania *not* to incite the Kosovars into an armed conflict.

Initially, the emergence of Sali Berisha as Albania's post-Cold War leader provided the Kosovars with additional support from the Albanian government. President Berisha was from Northern Albania and, like the Kosovars, he was a Gheg.¹¹³ Albania had undergone a tremendous political revolution, as the Communist leaders had all been of Tosk heritage or from Southern Albania.¹¹⁴ Sali Berisha was not unlike Alia in that he hoped to draw international attention to Kosovo and at the same time attract funding for Albania. The Democratic League of Kosovo responded with support for Berisha and the firm belief that a strong Albania was the secret to their success.

Unfortunately, Albania's socio-economic situation was very difficult and the Berisha regime was really in no position to offer any assistance except in the areas of education and some military training.¹¹⁵ Apparently there is evidence that some Kosovars have been trained in guerilla tactics at Labinot in central Albania.¹¹⁶

The execution of an Albanian unification plan would surely necessitate military action by the formidable Serb armed forces. Albania remains ill-equipped to deal with a bloody Bosnia-style conflict. Furthermore, there is still no evidence to suggest that a

¹¹³Mihas, p. 13.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Vickers and Pettifer, p. 154.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 156.

well-organized Albanian unification movement is ready to embark on such an endeavor. Nevertheless, Ibrahim Rugova continues to court Albanian leadership regardless of the ruling regime and Albania's deteriorating socio-economic situation. He expressed hope for Kosovar-Albanian relations in congratulating President Rexhep Mejdani and Speaker of the Parliament Skender Gjinushi on their recent victory.¹¹⁷ Interestingly, other Kosovar political parties have expressed disgust with the elections in Albania and have criticized the newly-elected leaders. Unlike his opposition, Rugova appears to understand that Albania has an international voice that can be used to attract external attention.

Apparently, most of the support for Albanian unification comes from Western Europe and the United States.

The notion of a unified Albania has much more active support in New York than it does in Albania. There are an estimated 350,000-400,000 Albanian-Americans, and the leaders of their various communities were active in promoting the issue of Kosovo.¹¹⁸

Traditionally, Albanians have crossed the border and moved into Kosovo to visit with ethnic Albanian relatives. Until recently, it was widely believed that Kosovars had a much higher standard of living. The repression that has occurred in Kosovo since 1989 has reversed the migration trend. Kosovars are now moving into Albania. An estimated 75,000 have crossed the border and as many as 500,000 could

¹¹⁷Kosovo Information Center, "President Rugova Congratulates New Albanian Leaders, Mejdani and Gjinushi," No. 1193, July 25, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-08-15.ksv.html>

¹¹⁸Vickers and Pettifer, p. 151.

cross in the event of a large-scale war.¹¹⁹ Albanians have received Kosovar refugees with mixed feelings. There is a growing perception amongst Albanians that the Kosovars are simply mafia-style criminals. However, it appears that the majority of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo who have chosen to settle in Albania have for the most part been aggressive in trying to establish economic security.

It is important to note that Albanians seem to fear a large-scale influx of Kosovars, as they have their own challenges to overcome after a recent paralyzing collapse of political and economic structures. This Albanian apprehension with regard to the situation in Kosovo has been coupled with a certain lack of sympathy for the quandary of the Kosovars. Albania has deployed forces to the Serb border along with a more cautious approach to the situation in the former autonomous province.

2. Ethnic Albanians and Balkan Borders

United Nations sanctions implemented against Belgrade created an environment for lucrative smuggling operations in the Southeastern Balkans. The borders of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo are an especially sensitive issue, as illegal cross-border trade provides support for the Kosovar economy. Serb border guards routinely exchange gunfire with Albanians and Macedonians along the border. This is a very serious issue as American forces are stationed along Macedonia's northern boundary with Kosovo. There have been multiple border incidents that have resulted in a number of deaths over the past several years. The border problem is

¹¹⁹Vickers and Pettifer, p. 156.

further exacerbated by Albanians from Montenegro who routinely smuggle goods across Lake Shkoder.¹²⁰

Montenegro's Albanians comprise about 6 percent of the population and their small numbers appear to keep them free of the conditions common to Kosovars. To date, Albanians in Montenegro have not been repressed and controlled by authorities, as it appears that they are much more integrated into the population. However, these Albanians together with Montenegro's Muslim population from the Sandžak region are for the most part against Serb policies (see figure 2). This situation has the potential to be problematic in the future, should conditions continue to worsen in neighboring Kosovo.

Unlike the Montenegrin police, the Macedonian police and security units have cracked down on Kosovars transiting the border, which is seen as a threat to regional stability. Macedonians have tried to restrict the free flow of goods across their territory and are quite nervous about a potential shift in the demographic situation. The majority of the ethnic Albanians traveling across the border are en route to visit with Albanian relatives in northern Macedonia. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia comprise almost thirty percent of the population and they do not face the same harsh treatment that has become common to Kosovars.¹²¹ However, human rights problems are developing and recent incidents with the police appear to support this trend.

¹²⁰Vickers and Pettifer, p. 183.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 171.




Figure 2. The Sandžak and Albanian Majority Areas (From Ref. Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*)

Apparently, the police have handcuffed and beaten Kosovars before deporting them.¹²² Additionally, Macedonian Police clashed with violent ethnic Albanians after the removal of Albanian and Turkish flags from municipal buildings in Tetovo and Gostivar, Macedonia. The ethnic Albanians detained by police for alleged involvement in the incidents claim that they were beaten and terrorized while in detention.

Although an effort has been made with some international support, Albania and Macedonia do not have the infrastructure in place to effectively monitor their border with Serbia. This has been proven with regard to the overall inability to effectively enforce economic sanctions against Serbia. The loss of the Yugoslav market with the imposition of sanctions was detrimental to the entire region as Balkan countries struggled with reform. In general, these countries found that it was not always in their best economic interests to enforce the United Nations sanctions.

In the end, the concept of a unified Albania in the Balkans remains unrealistic. Albania would have to spearhead the effort and at present does not have the political, economic, or military means with which to achieve such a goal. Moreover, the Kosovo issue seems to materialize in Albania only during periods of domestic discord, when politicians attempt to divert public attention. However, it is not unreasonable to expect some kind of Albanian military response in the wake of large-scale violence in Kosovo. The fragile Albanian military is undergoing re-development as part of an agreement with NATO to help rebuild its defense establishment. Albania is currently

¹²²Kosovo Information Center, "FYROM Police Ill-treat Kosova Albanians," No. 1193, July 25, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-07-25.ksv.html>

a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and has entered defense agreements with Turkey. Although unification with Albania would certainly mark an improvement in their current status, the majority of Kosovars continue to pursue independence. Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that Macedonia or Serbia would willingly surrender any territory that would allow for such a unification.

B. AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO

An independent Kosovo has been the goal of the majority of Kosovars since the establishment of the League of Prizren in the late 1880's. The 1968 Belgrade rejection of a petition for status as a republic resulted in unprecedented freedoms for Kosovo. Although the petition was refused, the Kosovars earned the right to display the Albanian flag, speak the Albanian language, and maintain their own education system.¹²³ The revocation of autonomy in 1989 was the impetus for the most organized modern crusade for independence. Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), as the party in power, have led ethnic Albanians toward this goal over the past six years.

Under a plan that would provide for independence, Kosovo would be allowed to secede from Serbia (FRY), much as Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia. Unfortunately for ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo, Serb domination over the region remains an overwhelming obstacle to secession.

¹²³Arshi Pipa, "The Political Situation of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, With Particular Attention to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach," p. 162.

They [Serbs] argue that the Albanians are not a people with a right to self-determination [i.e., such as the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina], but a mere national minority within Serbia.¹²⁴

Independence for Kosovo is impossible without sufficient support from the international community. It was stated earlier, that Albania has been the only country to actually recognize the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. Over the past several years it has become evident that the international community was ill-prepared to deal with the break-up of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, the absence of a common approach to the situation reflected negatively on the crisis. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords were the most productive international mediation, but they failed to address the conflict in Kosovo. To date, the United States and the European Union only support a restoration of autonomy as outlined by the 1974 constitution.

It is almost certain that any Kosovar attempt to secede from Serbia would provoke a large scale military response from Belgrade.¹²⁵ This type of military intervention is precisely what the United States has warned Serbia not to undertake.

C. INTENSIFIED FEDERALIZATION

An option that has been described as the Kosovar's second best solution for the future of Kosovo is that of a republic inside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Adem Demaci, the controversial leader of the Parliamentary Party (PPK) has

¹²⁴Steven Woehrel, "Kosovo: The Next Post-Yugoslav Crisis?" *CRS Report for Congress*, November 16, 1992, p. 5.

¹²⁵Troebst, p. 26.



Figure 3. Intensified Federalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (From Ref. Central Intelligence Agency Map, *Serbia-Montenegro*)

been the biggest supporter of this plan, which has increasingly been criticized within the Kosovar opposition.

This option would allow Serbia to maintain her current borders and much of the governing structure that has been established since the collapse of Yugoslavia. However, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) would become known as “Balkania” and would grant unprecedented freedom to Kosovars, Montenegrins, Hungarians in Vojvodina, and Muslims in the Sandžak region.¹²⁶ This would effectively end total Serb control over territory that is now considered Serbia-Montenegro, as a part of the FRY. Serbia would have the same status as four other “republics” within Balkania. In addition to Serbia, these “republics” would include Sandžak, Montenegro, and the former autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo (see figure 3).

Demaci has related that Balkania is his political project and he will do everything to see it come true.¹²⁷ He has also indicated that he is ready to part company with the Parliamentary Party over this issue. The opposition’s argument against “Balkania” is centered on the idea that the plan simply facilitates a greater Serbia. This view is countered by Demaci who relates that the plan is for a confederation and not a federation. Nevertheless, the Balkania concept runs counter to the strong Serb nationalism that has fought desperately to maintain control over the

¹²⁶Troebst, p. 26.

¹²⁷Kosovo Information Center, “Ready to Part Ways with the PPK over Balkania,” No. 1109, April 3, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-04-03.ksv.html>

territories of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the inability of the Kosovar opposition to tolerate any option other than independence significantly hampers Balkania's chances for success.

D. AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE

One solution that has been proposed for Kosovo includes the restoration of the autonomous status that the province enjoyed prior to revocation in 1989. Tito's new Yugoslav Constitution outlined autonomy for Kosovo in 1974 and it is this status that the international community has been most inclined to support.

The constitution that was developed in 1974 provided for eight federal units. These federal units included two provinces and six republics. The provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, were granted the same governing apparatus as the six republics. This structure included, but was not limited to, a Presidency, Government, Parliament, Constitution, and a Constitutional Court.¹²⁸ Additionally, Kosovo maintained representation in the Yugoslav Federal Government in Belgrade. Essentially, the only significant difference between the republics and an autonomous province was that the 1974 constitution provided the republics with right of secession.¹²⁹

Autonomy for Kosovo ended in the spring of 1989, after Belgrade's declaration of a state of emergency in the province. Slobodan Milosevic had concluded that the

¹²⁸Muhamedin Kullashi, "Kosovo and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia," *Balkan Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1994, p. 159.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 160.

elimination of autonomy in Kosovo was critical to his struggle for control over the Yugoslav republics.

By abolishing the autonomy of both provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, Serbia would directly control three-out-of eight votes in the Federal Presidency - in comparison with the other republics that had one vote each. That meant turning Yugoslavia into Serbo-slavia.¹³⁰

Milosevic manipulated the situation in Kosovo through purges and strong-arm tactics.

It was after the successful dismissal of the Party apparatus in Kosovo and Vojvodina that his command over the region began to solidify. The federal parliament embraced a series of amendments which resulted in a new Serb-dominated constitution.

Milosevic's control over the Kosovo assembly ensured passage of the new constitution.

It was in the adoption of this constitution that Kosovo had essentially voted to revoke its own autonomy.

Towards the end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's the Serbian Regime undertook "radical surgery" in Kosovo following the abolishment of autonomy - an act of violence which had no grounds in either the Serbian or the Federal Constitution - thus removing the Albanians as "foreign elements" from all institutions.¹³¹

The shocking actions of the Milosevic regime were met with condemnation by elements of the international community. The European Parliament passed a resolution declaring Belgrade's actions in Kosovo arbitrary and illegal.¹³²

¹³⁰Silber and Little, p. 38.

¹³¹Kullashi, p. 157.

¹³²Ibid., p. 161.

It is important to note that the restoration of autonomy to Kosovo would most likely improve Belgrade's standing with the international community. Currently, an outer layer of sanctions remains wrapped around Serbia for an array of policies that the international community finds unacceptable. Serb action on the Kosovo issue is a prerequisite for the lifting of these sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright has stated that unless there is real progress on the Kosovo issue the outer wall of sanctions in place against the Serbs will not be removed. Additionally, Belgrade must cooperate with the prosecution of war criminals at the Hague Tribunal if it expects any serious international recognition. The sanctions have prevented the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from joining international organizations such as the United Nations. They also forbid access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.¹³³

At the time of this writing, Kosovars and Serbs are both adamantly opposed to autonomy for Kosovo. The leaders of Kosovo's shadow state have related that they could never support a mere restoration of autonomy for Kosovo. They believe Serbia would revoke it again at the first opportunity.¹³⁴ Furthermore, the region has changed tremendously over the past ten years and these changes hinder the reestablishment of the type of autonomy common under the old system. The former republics of Tito's Yugoslavia have achieved independence through international recognition. Bosnia,

¹³³Kosovo Information Center, "Richard Miles: Outer Wall of Sanctions on Belgrade Remains," No. 1080, February, 21, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-02-21.ksv.html>

¹³⁴Steven Woehrel, p. 4.

Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia are no longer available to offset Serbia's power.

Autonomy would now have to exist only under Serbia and not under the Yugoslavia of yesteryear.

Organizations such as the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights have supported a return to autonomy and have also offered alternatives in the event Serbia should refuse such a request. One alternative that has been suggested is that of a Trusteeship for Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council would call on Serbia to place Kosovo under a Trusteeship that is administered by Articles 75-91 of the U.N. Charter.¹³⁵

The trust territory of Kosovo would be administered by the United Nations acting through the Trusteeship Council in a manner agreed to by the concerned parties. In addition, Kosovo could be designated a strategic area under the direct jurisdiction of the Security Council.¹³⁶

Basically, Kosovo would operate as an autonomous province for a designated period, allowing international mediators the opportunity to design a long term solution to the crisis. In the event that Serbia expresses its opposition to placing Kosovo under a United Nations Trusteeship, a U.N. safe-haven status remains an unlikely, but potential option.¹³⁷

In truth, it is extremely difficult to envision Serbia granting autonomy, a U.N. Trusteeship, or safe-haven status for Kosovo. Serb intransigence is further

¹³⁵Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, p. 5.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 6.

¹³⁷Ibid.

complicated by the Kosovar refusal to support anything less than independence. Adem Demaci, the leader of the second most powerful party amongst the Kosovar opposition has been ostracized for the introduction of more modest options such as those alluded to above.

E. ETHNIC DIVISION

Although extremely unlikely, the Serbs and Albanians view the division of Kosovo along ethnic, religious, historical, or economic lines as a possible option in lieu of total control over the province.¹³⁸ In addition to Kosovo's sacred significance, the reliance of Serbia on the province for natural resources complicates any effort to divide Kosovo along ethnic lines.

A study conducted by Belgrade University's Mining and Geological School has indicated that Kosovo has one of the largest coal basins in Europe.¹³⁹ Apparently, the region has a reserve of almost 13.2 billion tons of coal with an estimated value of \$125 billion.¹⁴⁰ Unfortunately, a situation similar to that of Bosnia-Herzegovina might result, as Albanians and Serbs wrestle for control over key assets and installations within the province. It is important to note that there is an array of different proposals for the ethnic division of Kosovo. The most probable scenario would include a Kosovo, in which the Serb population would control territory of economic and

¹³⁸Troebst, p. 26.

¹³⁹Kosovo Information Center, "Coal Reserves in Kosova Worth at Least USD 125 Billion, Serb Experts Say," No. 1067, February 4, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-02-04.ksv.html>

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*

TABLE 1
KOSOVO POPULATION STATISTICS

YEAR	TOTAL NUMBER	ALBANIAN %	SERB %	OTHER %
1913	497,456			
1921	439,010	66.0	26.0	8.0
1931	552,064	60.0	33.0	7.0
1948	733,034			
1953	815,908			
1961	963,988			
1971	1,243,393			
1981	1,588,400	77.0	13.0	10.0
1991*	2,000,000	90.0	8.0	2.0

Source: Musa Limani, *The Geographic Position, Natural Riches, Demographic Characteristics, and the Economical Development of Kosovo*, Pristina, Kosovo: The Association of Lawyers, 1992.

*The data for 1991 is estimated, the census of that year was boycotted by the Albanian population. This table has been adapted and modified from the source.

TABLE 2
POPULATION OF KOSOVO

COMMUNE	TOTAL	ALBANIANS	SERBS	MONTENEGRINS	OTHER
KOSOVO	1,584,558	1,227,424	209,792	26,875	120,467
DECANI	40,661	39,195	247	914	305
DRAGASHI	34,894	18,582	88	20	16,204
FERIZAJI	113,935	90,645	18,642	317	4,331
GJAKOVA	92,091	87,448	1,936	1,953	754
GJILANI	84,196	59,802	19,339	176	4,879
GLLOGOVCI	40,522	40,443	35	5	39
ISTOGU	50,011	35,806	7,728	1,875	4,602
KACANIKU	31,075	30,393	310	15	357
KAMENICA	48,216	32,352	14,759	62	1,043
KLINA	54,449	45,418	6,878	971	2,172
LEPOSAVIQI	16,941	853	15,035	81	972
LIPJANI	60,094	43,110	10,297	355	6,332
MITROVICA	105,097	66,618	25,867	1,972	10,640
PEJA	111,067	79,793	8,037	9,810	13,427
PODUJEVA	75,320	72,089	2,226	603	402
PRISHTINA	211,156	140,907	44,227	6,276	19,746
PRIZENI	134,689	93,902	11,671	517	28,599
RAHOVECI	61,048	56,208	4,039	212	589
SERBICA	46,907	45,467	1,116	136	188
SUHAREKA	59,406	55,663	3,581	30	132
VITIA	47,112	35,234	7,576	169	4,133
VUCITERNA	65,671	57,496	6,158	406	1,611

Source: Peter Prifti, "Kosova's Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Pipa and Repishti, *Studies on Kosova*, p. 159, adapted from a table in Rilindja, May 14, 1981.

religious interest. It has been estimated that this sub-divisioning of the province would include almost forty percent of Kosovo.¹⁴¹ According to 1981 figures, Serbs are most prevalent in the northernmost sections of Kosovo (see table 2).¹⁴² As stated earlier, ethnic Albanians comprise ninety percent of the almost two million inhabitants and they are rapidly expanding into areas traditionally dominated by Serbs. Belgrade has tried to halt Serb migration out of Kosovo by restricting the sale of Serb real estate. A territorial division is further complicated by the existence of Serb enclaves and cultural monuments that are scattered throughout Kosovo (see figure 4).

Critical to an examination of the potential ethnic division of Kosovo is the shift in demographics and the Serb effort to reverse this trend. As remarked upon earlier, in the recent round of Serb nationalism fostered by Slobodan Milosevic the rights and liberties of the majority of the population in Kosovo were revoked. The Serbs view the Kosovars as simply a minority within Serbia. This view is fraught with danger for Kosovo's future. Dusan Janjic, author of *National Identities, Movements and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians*, has referred to the Serb program in Kosovo as a program of war.¹⁴³ Unfortunately for the Serb minority in the province, Kosovo essentially became a republic as a result of the autonomous status that it was afforded

¹⁴¹Dusan Janjic, "National Identities, Movements and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians," *Balkan Forum*, Vol. 3, No. 1, December 1994, p. 57.

¹⁴²Peter Prifti, "Kosova's Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), *Studies on Kosova*, Columbia University Press, 198, p. 159. It is important to note that ethnic Albanians have boycotted post-1981 attempts by Belgrade to assess the population and demographic situation in Kosovo.

¹⁴³Janjic, p. 53.

under the 1974 constitution. This appears to have been a key turning point in the demographic history of the region, as the ethnic Albanian population became the majority in an autonomous Kosovo rather than a minority in Serbia (see table 1).

Janjic points out the danger of repressing the ethnic Albanian majority in an effort to reverse Kosovar dominance. Additionally, ethnic Albanian control in an autonomous Kosovo has reinforced the belief that Albania is the only nation in Europe divided by international borders.¹⁴⁴ It is clear that any future attempt to divide Kosovo along ethnic lines has explosive potential for the entire region and could lead to an expanded ethnic war.

F. ETHNIC WARFARE IN THE BALKANS

Sadly, ethnic warfare has ripped through the Balkans, destroying lives and causing untold physical damage. Ethnic violence in Kosovo is currently ongoing and could very well expand to cause a much larger regional conflict. This type of conflict would most likely have the same bloody characteristics as the recent hostilities in Bosnia or the First and Second Balkan Wars fought prior to World War I.

Obviously, a move for independence in Kosovo that would result in ethnic warfare would not be in the best interest of many bordering countries in the region. Many of Kosovo's neighbors have large populations of ethnic Albanians who are sympathetic to the Kosovars. At this time, there is nothing to prevent these Albanians from intervening in such a conflict, which could result in a regional war. Specifically,

¹⁴⁴Janjic, p. 53.

Macedonia and Greece are not in favor of an independent Kosovo, as they fear that their own Albanian populations may seek to unify for a greater Albania.¹⁴⁵

The titular nation of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian community of Macedonia no doubt would be polarized, radicalized, and ultimately mobilized to such a degree that direct involvement and even intervention could not be excluded.¹⁴⁶

As referred to earlier, a war in Kosovo would most likely drive hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees out of the province. These refugees would flow into neighboring Balkan states that are currently not able to accommodate them. Such a shift in regional demographics would result in ethnic violence involving Turkish and Albanian minorities in Macedonia. This type of ethnic violence would most likely involve Turkey, Albania, Greece, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is within these countries that Kosovars have recently sought refuge. Furthermore, Balkan states also have a direct interest in protecting their respective minorities in the region.

Border guards at the Romanian checkpoint of Calafat in 1993 said that an estimated 80,000 Kosovo Albanians had passed through in a year. The Kosovo Albanians consistently described themselves as tourists but the buses in which they traveled generally came back empty. Most of the tourists were single males between the ages of 18 and 20 anxious to avoid being drafted by the Serbian army. Having traveled through Romania these people would typically go to Hungary and the Czech Republic before crossing illegally into Germany.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵Milo Paskal, "The Albanian Question within the Current Context of the Balkan Crisis," *Balkan Forum*, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1995, p. 128.

¹⁴⁶Troebst, p. 27.

¹⁴⁷Owen Bennett Jones, "Albanians in Kosovo: Prospects for the Future," *Writenet*, October 1994. Online. Available <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wriyug.htm>

A Fourth Balkan War as outlined above would present major problems for NATO. A conflict involving Greece and Turkey has the potential to split the alliance. United States involvement is also quite likely in a Balkan war, should ethnic violence spread throughout the region. U.S. forces continue to patrol the Macedonian border and are heavily involved in SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, two U.S. administrations have threatened military action should the Serbs attack ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

It is possible that a major ethnic war in the Balkans is avoidable. Although a conflict ignited in Kosovo may distract Serbs from domestic issues, it would harm Serbia economically and internationally. However, prospects for the continuation of a relatively stable status quo are diminishing as the Kosovars alter their approach to resistance.

G. STATUS QUO

The pressure continues to build in Kosovo, as the Serbs remain steadfast in their domination over the region. The Kosovars are equally dedicated to their goal of independence, and the expanding communication gap between the two sides may prove fatal to Kosovo's future. Economic hardship coupled with a distinct shift in the strategy of the Kosovar opposition may make the status quo much more difficult to maintain.

Each of the parties in the Kosovo drama has its own arguments which ought to be respected, but their ultimate objectives are unattainable without war.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸Janjic, p. 58.

Kosovo is going nowhere as far as economic growth and development are concerned. The absence of international financial and political support has restricted progress tremendously for all of Serbia. A serious imbalance is possible as Kosovo's Balkan neighbors continue to develop while Kosovo remains stagnant and unproductive under Serb repression. This scenario is not just bad for Kosovo, but it is also very bad for Serbia, as the outer wall of sanctions continues to restrict progress in Serbia.

Milosevic's policies may be contrasted with those of other former Yugoslav republics Slovenia and Croatia. These former republics have fostered a positive relationship with the international community and this has paved the way for development, politically, economically, and militarily. Slobodan Milosevic, the so-called master of Balkan politics, appears to be slowly destroying both Serbia and Kosovo with his repressive policies. Milosevic is not alone in creating an explosive environment that threatens Balkan stability. Essential to an easing of tensions in Kosovo is for the ethnic Albanians to recognize that the problem is not simply Albanian.¹⁴⁹ The cultural significance of Kosovo coupled with Belgrade's concern for the Serb minority are immense barriers to effective conflict resolution.

The parallel system that has developed under the Kosovar opposition has actually reduced the communication between the two sides, making cooperation even more of a challenge. The two sides have drifted further apart in recent years. The Kosovars continue to manage their own affairs under a shadow system that appears to

¹⁴⁹Janjic, p. 60.

be achieving some degree of permanence. Aside from financial cooperation, the need for a Serb contribution in Kosovo continues to diminish with time.

It is quite possible that stagnant conditions in Kosovo could prevail for many years. However, as alluded to earlier, the chances are less likely for peaceful coexistence as Kosovars shift their opposition tactics from passive resistance to violence through terrorism. The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) is the foremost example of the aforementioned phenomenon. Violence has escalated with the increased action of the UCK and this does not bode well for the prevention of ethnic war. Additionally, protests are getting harder for Ibrahim Rugova to control. Recently, Rugova told university students to hold off planned protests on failed education accords. His request stemmed from a renewed effort to address the issue with Serb leaders. The students protested despite Rugova's request and Serb riot police responded with tear gas. This lack of control on the part of the opposition's leadership is particularly dangerous for the already strained relationship between Kosovars and Serbs. It is the younger and more radical ethnic Albanian population that is most frustrated with the lack of progress associated with passive resistance. The Kosovars are well aware that they are not able to wage conventional war against the Serbs. This has resulted in the experimentation with dangerous guerilla tactics in an effort to achieve their goals.

International mediation could very well be the key to crisis prevention in Kosovo. The presence of NATO forces in the region may act as a deterrent to ethnic war. The United States has expressed its commitment to peace in the region as

indicated through the May 1997 National Security Strategy. Additionally, U.S. legislators have allocated \$6 million in continued financial support for fiscal year 1998.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, a six-nation contact group that includes the United States, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, and Britain has pushed for the opening of a dialogue on Kosovo.¹⁵¹ An increase in international involvement may serve to close the expanding communication gap which would ease tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians.

International involvement in Kosovo has the potential to keep the crisis from worsening, but Serbia appears to remain the key to a successful resolution. Recently, Serbia has been rocked with political demonstrations that have resulted from a deteriorating domestic situation. Slobodan Milosevic has successfully maneuvered himself into the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as it was no longer constitutional for him to remain President of Serbia. Although he has been successful in maintaining political control over the FRY, Milosevic's party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), has received a significant challenge from opposition parties.

At the time of this writing, it appears that the opposition in Serbia is equally dedicated to Serb nationalism and the current repressive policies toward Kosovo. As long as Kosovars continue to boycott Serb elections there will be no incentive for Serb

¹⁵⁰Kosovo Information Center, "Appropriations Bill for U.S. to provide USD 6 Million for Kosova Next year," No. 1192, July 24, 1997. Online. *Kosovo Daily Report*. August 31, 1997. Available http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/96-12-03_1.ksv.html

¹⁵¹"Contact Group Expresses Concern on Kosovo," *OMRI Daily Digest*, RFE/RL, September 25, 1997.

politicians to address ethnic Albanian interests. A continuation of the status quo does not bode well for Kosovo in the future. Pressure continues to build as the international community insists that the Kosovars seek a solution through a Serbia that is unwilling to negotiate. Unfortunately, the absence of a mechanism to release this pressure may prevent a lasting peace in the region.

VI. CONCLUSION

Unless the international community takes drastic actions in Kosovo, the outlook for the Balkans is extraordinarily gloomy and the expansion of war highly probable.¹⁵²

The volatile situation between Serbs and ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo has provided the foundation for a Fourth Balkan War. To date, this unstable situation has not been addressed by the international community. Incredibly, the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords did not address the crisis in Kosovo. A lasting peace in the Balkans may be impossible without resolution of this issue, which served as a catalyst for the most recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

An historical overview has shown that the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated steadily since the revocation of autonomy by the Milosevic regime in 1989. Belgrade has repeatedly promised never to surrender control over this region, which is dotted with Serb monasteries and churches. The Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic, continues to preside over a campaign of severe repression that has denied the majority of Kosovo's population their constitutional rights. In the future, Milosevic will most likely take every precaution to ensure that no concessions are granted that might contradict the policy that helped him achieve power. It appears that repression will continue regardless of the regime in Serbia, as Serb nationalism remains an effective platform for the consolidation of political power. Additionally, neglect of the rapidly expanding Albanian majority has

¹⁵²Biberaj, p. 2.

resulted in the perilous escalation toward ethnic warfare. The tumultuous history of this region is indicative of the challenge to security in the future.

This study has examined several scenarios in an attempt to assess the future of Kosovo. Again, these scenarios included the concept of a greater Albania, an independent Kosovo, the further federalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a reestablishment of autonomy, the partitioning of the province, ethnic war, and a continuation of the status quo. There does not appear to be an agreeable solution to the conflict as menacing pressure continues to build in an atmosphere already ripe for war.

Clearly, the Kosovars have become increasingly impatient with the torpid situation and the impending sense of doom in Kosovo. President Ibrahim Rugova's campaign of passive resistance has not improved conditions for ethnic Albanians in the former autonomous province. The inability of the Democratic League of Kosovo to bring about required change has resulted in the emergence of numerous competing political organizations. These political organizations are pursuing alternative goals and demonstrate the high level of discord among ethnic Albanians. Despite numerous requests by Ibrahim Rugova, many ethnic Albanians have not halted their political activism when the opposition leadership felt it was inappropriate. An absence of authority over the restless opposition has exacerbated the already inconstant situation. Radical activity in Rugova's own party and open disobedience during recent student demonstrations are evidence of an unhealthy breakdown in the Kosovars' steadfast commitment to restraint. This is the same Kosovar restraint that former Ambassador Zimmerman claimed as critical for peace and stability in Kosovo.

The recent emergence of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) illustrates the dangerous shift from peaceful resistance to the potential for armed insurrection. This violent pursuit of political goals through terrorism has reinforced the high level of distress that Kosovars feel with their everyday life. Although not well-organized at this time, recent UCK bombings have suggested a certain degree of sophistication in doctrine and tactics. Furthermore, the UCK's expanded target list and stepped-up activity has seemingly pushed Kosovo further down the road to regional conflict.

While ethnic Albanians in Kosovo need to understand the Serb attraction to the region, Serbs must recognize the demographic realities in Kosovo. Kosovo's separate institutions of government, education, health care, and media outlets have created an unhealthy separation between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. The Kosovars continue to refuse participation in elections sponsored by Belgrade and the result has been the absence of a dialogue considered essential for peace in the region. The international community may be able to restore this dialogue through contact groups and more involvement, but both sides must be willing to work for harmonization. In the end, Serb intransigence, the recent emergence of an armed Kosovar opposition, and the lack of communication coupled with the absence of international resolve continue to weaken the chances for a peaceful future in Kosovo.

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